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THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
MEANINGLESS VERBIAGE OR 
MISGUIDED NOTION? 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
As one might suspect from the title, this Article attacks the busi-
ness judgment rule. In fact, it advocates the rule's abolition. Admit-
tedly, this is not a minor task given that the rule, in one form or 
another, extends back through 160 years of judicial decisions.1 
Indeed, just recently, the American Law Institute enshrined a version 
of the rule in its Principles of Corporate Governance.2 
At first glance, the general concept behind the rule seems unas-
sailable. Courts generally should exercise caution in second guessing 
corporate directors' decisions, at least when the directors do not face 
any conflict of interest when they make decisions. However, a prob-
lem occurs when courts and writers attempt to inject specific content 
into this general proposition-immediately, a lack of consensus 
• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.S. 1974, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1977, University of California, Berkeley. I wish to thank 
James Adams, Melvin Eisenberg, Clark Kelso, and Jan Rein for their helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts of this Article. 
1. One of the earliest cases expressing the idea that directors should not be liable for 
errors in judgment is Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). See also Godbold v. 
Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847) (holding that bank directors are not responsible for judgment 
errors unless so grossly wrong as to show fraud or lack of knowledge); Hodges v. New England 
Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850) (holding that directors exercising ordinary care and prudence are 
not responsible for mistaken charter violations). 
2. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.0l(c}, at 181-82 (1992) (hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]: 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty 
under this Section if the director or officer: 
(I} is not interested ... in the subject of business judgment; 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of business judgment to the extent 
the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances ; and 
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
287 
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emerges as to what the rule really is. Part I of this Article explores its 
various interpretations. 
Part I shows that interpretations of the business judgment rule 
fall into two broad categories. In the first category, the rule essen-
tially stands for the proposition that directors are not liable for their 
decisions unless there is a reason to hold the directors liable-such as 
when the directors have breached their duty of care.3 Gee! A corol-
lary to this interpretation of the "rule" is that the mere existence of a 
bad outcome from a business decision, or the fact that some individu-
als might disagree with the decision's wisdom, does not mean the deci-
sion was negligent.4 Needless to say, if this was the only interpretation 
of the business judgment rule, then any further discussion of the 
"rule"-not to mention the "rule" itself-would be largely pointless. 
The practical significance of the business judgment rule comes 
from the second category of interpretations. Here, many courts, writ-
ers, and now the American Law Institute, view the rule as imposing a 
substantive qualification upon directors' liability for breach of the 
duty of care. Specifically, under these interpretations, directors must 
be guilty of a greater degree of fault than ordinary negligence in order 
to face liability.5 The precise degree of fault varies substantially 
depending upon the court or writer. However , all of this category's 
proponents agree that the standards of ordinary negligence sufficient 
to create liability for automobile drivers, doctors, lawyers, and just 
about anyone else except children are not sufficient in an action on 
behalf of the corporation against its directors. 
Part II of this Article examines this proposition. Why do direc-
tors occupy a privileged caste vis-a-vis other private individuals who 
are sued for negligence? Adherents to certain schools of thought 
might explain this distinction as simply another example of the law 
favoring those with greater wealth and power.6 It is not the purpose 
of this Article, however, to engage in such speculation. Instead, Part 
II assesses the viability of the articulated rationales behind the special 
treatment. Many argue that policy concerns about deterring business 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 14-24. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 25-35. 
5. See infra pan 11.B. 
6. In contrast to directors, even doctors and attorneys, who are subject to a more stringent 
standard in malpract ice cases, are for the most part only members of the upper-middle class. 
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risk-taking justify a more lenient standard when subjecting board deci-
sions to after-the-fact review.7 Others point to the nature of the dam-
ages caused by director mistakes8 or to facts which make the typical 
plaintiff shareholder less than a sympathetic victim.9 Adherents to 
law-and-economics methodology assert that director liability for negli-
gence serves little utility.10 Part II shows these rationales largely fall 
victim to the same flaw: They fail to justify a differentiation between 
directors and other prospective tort defendants who can and do assert 
similar arguments for more lenient treatment. 
In the end, the business judgment rule turns out to be either 
meaningless (the first category of interpretation) or misguided (the 
second category). This Article therefore concludes that the rule 
should be abolished and directors be required to live with the same 
rules of negligence as everyone else. 
I. WHAT IS THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE? 
Defining the business judgment rule is no easy task; just ask the 
drafters of the most recent revision of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act. They initially thought it would be a good idea to include the 
rule as part of the Act. This made sense because the Act sets out a 
standard for directors' duty of care11 which is closely related to the 
rule. This process broke down, however, when the drafters could not 
reach a consensus on a formulation of the rule.12 As one of the par-
ticipants explained, "[WJe are saying that there is a business judgment 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 77-91. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 115,18. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 126,29. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 142-55. 
11. REvrsED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr § 8.30 (1985) (hereinafter M.B.C.A.]. Section 
8.30 is based on Section 35 as later added to the 1969 ve~ion of the Model Business Corporation 
Act Id. § 8.30 Official Cmt. The adoption of Section 35 itself had set off a debate concerning its 
relationship to the business judgment rule. E.g., E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, 
Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of 
Care Compared With Delaware Law, 35 Bus . LAW. 919 (1980); S. Samuel A~ht & Joseph Hinsey 
IV, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 
(1980). 
12. In the end, the Model Act simply punts by including the following apologia in the 
Official Comment to section 8.30: 
The elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its application 
are continuing to be developed by the courts, in view of that continuing judicial <level· 
opment, section 8.30 does not try to codify the business judgment rule or to delineate 
the differences, if any, between that rule and the standards of director conduct set forth 
in this section. That is a task left to the courts and possibly to later revisions of this 
Model Act. 
M.B.C.A. § 8.30 Official Cmt. 
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rule, that we know what it is and when it should be applied, but we 
can't define it." 13 
Much of the difficulty with efforts to define the business judg-
ment rule, such as that involved with the Model Act, stems from a 
faulty starting premise. This premise is that there is a business judg-
ment rule. In fact, there is no single rule. Instead, the phrase ''the 
business judgment rule" has a number of different meanings. To aid 
analysis, it is useful to group these meanings into two categories. 
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE As A TAUTOLOGICAL 
STATEMENT 
A widely used hornbook on corporate law14 provides a good illus-
tration of the first common usage of the phrase "the business judg-
ment rule." In black letter, the book's authors state, "The 'business 
judgment' rule sustains corporate transactions and immunizes man-
agement from liability where the transaction is within the powers of 
the corporation (intra vires) and the authority of management, and 
involves the exercise of due care and compliance with applicable fidu-
ciary duties."1s Numerous court decisions contain similar descriptions 
of the so-called rule.16 For example, in Miller v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co.,17 the court explained: 
The sound business judgment rule ... expresses the unanimous 
decision of American courts to eschew intervention in corporate 
decision-making if the judgment of directors and officers is uninflu-
enced by personal considerations and is exercised in good faith .... 
Underlying the rule is the assumption that reasonable diligence has 
been used in reaching the decision which the rule is invoked to 
justify.18 
A moment's reflection establishes that these statements really do 
not say much of anything. Stating that directors will be immune from 
13. ROBERT W . HAMILTON, CoRPORATIONS: INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS: CASES AND MATERIALS 703 (4th ed . 1990). 
14. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1983). 
15. Id. at 661; see also RoeERT C. CLA:llK, CoRPORAn: LAw 123-25 (1986). 
16. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F .2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) , cerr. denied, 454 U.S. 
1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Whittaker Corp. v. 
Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N .D . Ill. 1982); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp . 240, 
243-244 (D. Neb . 1972), atfd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp . 
705, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Casey v. Woodruff , 49 N.Y .S.2d 625, 642-643 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
17. 507 F.2d 759 (3d ar. 1974). 
18. Id. at 762. 
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liability so long as they act with due care ( or reasonable diligence) and 
comply with their fiduciary duties (that is, are disinterested and act in 
good faith) is simply saying that directors will not be liable for their 
decisions unless there is a reason for holding them liable. Specifically, 
directors will only be held liable if they breach their duties of care or 
loyalty. This is hardly an earth-shattering proposition. Similarly, the 
expression that the rule "sustains transactions"-in other words, the 
court will not deny effectiveness to decisions of the board of direc-
tors-so long as there is authority, due care, and no breach of fiduci-
ary duty, is simply another way of saying that the board has the 
statutory power to manage the corporation and the court will not 
interfere without some grounds. 19 
As might be expected, there are a number of variations on this 
use of the phrase. For example, some sources point out that the rule 
only applies to business judgments-in other words, the challenge 
must involve a decision the directors made rather than an instance in 
which the directors were merely inattentive. 20 Other sources add 
assorted items such as the absence of fraud21 or illegality,22 to the pre-
requisites for the rule's protection. These additions may be margin-
ally useful for those desiring a handy checklist of ways in which 
directors can breach their duties of care or loyalty, but there still is not 
much real significance to this "rule." Another common variation on 
this theme is to state the "rule" as containing a rebuttable presump-
tion.23 The presumption is that the directors did not violate their 
duties-in other words, did not put themselves in a conflict of interest, 
act in bad faith or without due care, or the like-when they made 
19. At lea.~t one writer has attempted to introduce a different label (the "business judgment 
doctrine ") for the question of whether a court will deny effect to a decision by the board, as 
opposed to holding the directors personally liable for damages. Joseph Hinsey JV, Business 
Judgment and the American Law lnstitute 's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doc-
trine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609, 611-13 (1984). Beyond semantics, the signifi-
cance lies in the possibility that courts might apply a different standard in addres sing the issue of 
whether to deny effect versus the question of wheth er to award damages. 
20. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984); PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORAn: 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 230. 
21. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied , 454 
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
22. E.g., Miller, 507 F.2d at 762; Shlensky , 237 N.E .2d at 780; Ellerman v. Chicago Junction 
Rys. & Union Stock-Yards, 23 A. 287, 292 (N.J. Ch. 1891). 
23. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acqui sition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Treadway Cos., 638 F.2d at 382; Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (Del. 1966). 
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their decision .24 Here, too, there is less substance then meets the eye. 
This "presumption" entails nothing more than saying that the plaintiff 
who challenges a decision of the board has the burden of proving that 
the directors breached one of their duties. Yet, the proposition that 
the plaintiff, in any context, has the burden of proving his or her prima 
facie case is a rule with which every first-year law student should be 
familiar. 
Given the not-surprising conclusion that directors are only liable 
if the plaintiff proves that the directors breached their duties, the 
question then becomes whether the business judgment rule says any-
thing significant about what it takes to prove a breach , particularly of 
the duty of care. For many courts and writers the answer is really no. 
These courts and writers apply concepts of ordinary negligence to 
identify conduct that breaches the directors ' duty of care. 25 For exam-
ple, in one of the most often quoted reconciliations of the business 
judgment rule with the law of negligence, a New York trial court 
explained : 
The question is frequently asked, how does the operation of the 
so-called "business judgment rule" tie in with the concept of negli-
gence? There is no conflict between the two. When courts say that 
they will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presup -
posed that judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been 
exercised.26 
Probably the most widely cited case actually applying an ordinary 
negligence standard to find directors liable for a business decision is 
24. The business judgment rule is . . . a presumption that in making a busin ess decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest s of the company . .. . The 
burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the 
pre sumption. 
Aron.son, 473 A.2d at 812. 
25. E.g., McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums , 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974); Keyser v. 
Commonwealth Nat'! Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D . Pa . 1987); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid 
Co ., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), a!fd , 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir . 1973); Otis & Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D . Pa. 1945), a/fd , 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Bailey v. 
Babcock , 241 F . 501 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight. 197 N.E . 649 (Mass. 
1935); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown , 171 N .E . 42 (Ma ss. 1930); Hun v. Cary , 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); 
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup . Ct. 1944); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co ., 
594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979); NoRMAN D. LA1TIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 273-74 (2d ed. 
1971); S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979); 
Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded , 
24 SuFFOLIC U. L. R.Ev. 923 (1990) . 
26. Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 643. 
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Litwin v. Allen.27 In Litwin, a New York trial court held the directors 
of Guaranty Trust Company liable for their decision to purchase three 
million dollars of debentures . The problem, as the court saw it, was 
that the purchase agreement gave the seller the option to repurchase 
the debentures at the sale price within six months. This put the risk of 
loss if the debentures declined in value-as they in fact did-on Guar-
anty Trust. At the same time, Guaranty Trust did not obtain the cor-
responding potential for gain, because, if the debentures appreciated, 
the seller presumably could exercise its option to repurchase. The 
court concluded: 
There is more here than a question of business judgment as to which 
men might well differ. The directors plainly failed in this instance to 
bestow the care which the situation demanded. Unless we are to do 
away entirely with the doctrine that directors of a bank are liable 
for negligence in administering its affairs liability should be imposed 
in connection with this transaction. 28 
The court further explained its view of the business judgment rule 
when it stated , "[D]irectors are liable for negligence in the perform-
ance of their duties. Not being insurers, directors are not liable for 
errors of judgment or for mistakes while acting with reasonable skill 
arid prudence . . .. "29 
This version of the business judgment rule continues the type of 
broad tautological statement quoted earlier to an unexceptional con-
clusion: Directors are not liable unless they breach their duties of loy-
alty or care, and the duty of care is that of reasonable skill and 
prudence-the same standard as is the norm throughout the law of 
torts.30 About the only thing the "rule" adds is a cautionary note that 
an error in judgment or a mistake-in the sense of a decision that 
does not tum out as one hoped-does not automatically equal negli-
gence. This same caution could be sounded for doctors, lawyers, or 
automobile drivers sued for their mistakes.31 
27. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
28. Id. at 699. 
29. Id. at 678. 
30. See, e.g., RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 283 cmt. c (1965) (equating "reasonabl e 
man" and "ordinary prudence"); RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 379(1) (1984). 
31. The fundamental concept of negligence does not vary, whether it is applied to the 
case of a simple personal injury action or to liability of directors in the management of 
the affairs of their corporation . A pedestrian crossing the street is under a duty to use 
reasonable care. He is required to look before he crosses, but "the law does not say 
how often he must look or precisely how far, or when or from where ... . If he has used 
his eyes, and has miscalculated the danger, he may still be free from fault." The law 
does not hold him guilty of negligence although if he had looked oftener the accident 
might have been avoided. He discharges his duty when he has acted with reasonable 
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In fact, while no one speaks of a "medical," "legal," or "vehicle 
operator judgment rule," there is a similar cautionary "rule" some-
times invoked especially in the medical-malpractice field. This is the 
"honest error in judgment rule." 32 The Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Ouellette v. Subak33 quoted a typical expression of this rule: "A [phy-
sician] is not a guarantor of a cure or a good result from his treatment 
and he is not responsible for an honest error in judgment in choosing 
between accepted methods of treatment." 34 The parallel between this 
language and the language in Litwin and in numerous similar invoca-
tions of the business judgment rule is evident. 35 
prudence. So it is with directors. The law requires the use of judgment, the judgment 
of ordinary prudence, but it does not hold directors liable simply because they might 
have used better judgment. 
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625,643 (Sup. a. 1944) (citation omitted); see also Hun v. Cary , 
82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880) ("Such is the rule applicable ... to professional men and to mechanics, and 
such is the rule which must be applicable to every person who undertakes to act for another in a 
situation or employment requiring skill and knowledge."); Ar sht, supra note 25, at 97 ("The 
primary function of the business judgment rule may be simply to accord to directon the same 
necessary protection that professionals enjoy under Anglo-American tort law if sued for 
malpractice."). 
32. E.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); 
Kirsch v. Duryea, 578 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal. 1978); Rainer v. Buena Community Memorial Hosp., 
95 Cal. Rptr . 901, 913-14 (Ct. App. 1981); Dickens v. Everhart, 199 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. 1973). 
Curiously, the parallel between the honest error in judgment rule and the business judgment rule 
seems only recently to have received recognition. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Core of 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. Prrr. L REV. 945, 961 (1990). 
33. 391 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986). 
34. ld. at 813. The court in Ouellette went on to reformulate the "rule" out of concern that 
the phrase an "honest error in judgment" in the quoted jury instruction could mislead the fact 
finder into putting too much emphasis on the defendant's subjective good intentions. The court 
restated the rule: 
A doctor is not negligent simply because his or her efforts prove unsuccessful. The fact 
a doctor may have chosen a method of treatment that later proves to be unsuccessful is 
not negligence if the treatment chosen was an accepted treatment on the basis of the 
information available to the doctor at the time a choice had to be made; a doctor must, 
however, use reasonable care to obtain the information needed to exercise his or her 
professional judgment, and an unsuccessful method of treatment chosen because of a 
failure to use such reasonable care would be negligence . 
Id. at 816. The relevance for the business-judgment-rule context of the court's concern with 
subjective phraseology will be addressed later. The "unavoidable accident rule" plays a some-
what similar role in many tort cases, reminding the fact finder that the mere existence of an 
injury does not mean there was negligence . E.g., Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 320 P.2d 500, 508 
(Cal. 1958) (Schauer, J., dissenting). 
35. See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240,244 (D. Neb . 1972), a!fd, 473 
F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Directors and officers of a corporation may become liable to it or the 
shareholden for negligence in the performance of their corporate duties. However, they are not 
insurers and are not generally held liable for errors of judgment or mistakes while acting with 
reasonable skill and prudence ."); Bailey v. Babcock, 241 F. 501, 515 (W.D. Pa. 1915) ("But for 
an honest error of judgment the law has no puni shment."); Casey, 49 N. Y.S.2d at 642 ("Mistakes 
in the exercise of honest business judgment do not subject the directors to liability for negligence 
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B. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE As A SPECIAL STANDARD OF 
LIABILITY FOR DUTY OF CARE VIOLATIONS 
An alternate interpretation of the business judgment rule is far 
more significant. Numerous courts and writers-now joined by the 
American Law Institute-view the business judgment rule as provid-
ing a special standard of culpability against which to assess whether 
directors breached their duty of care.36 Unfortunately, these courts 
and commentators disagree on what the standard is or should be. 
Worse still, several factors complicate any effort to delineate the 
respective views. For one thing, judicial opinions in this area are 
replete with imprecise and inconsistent use of language.37 As a result, 
some opinions sound as if they are employing different standards, 
when, in fact, the courts really mean the same thing.38 Alternately , 
some formulations may sound the same, but, in fact, embody quite 
different standards. 39 In addition, the different standards in this area 
range along a continuum, rather than representing discrete splits of 
authority. 40 Nevertheless, it is possible to discern three major view-
points which go far to define this spectrum. The viewpoints' common 
bond is that each holds that director liability under the business judg-
ment rule requires greater fault than ordinary negligence. 
in the discharge of their fiduciary duties. The standard is one of reasonable diligence, not the 
utmost amount of diligence."). 
36. More precisely, the rule represents the standard when the alleged breach of the duty of 
care involves a decision made by directors-including a decision to refrain from acting-as 
opposed to complete inattention to their jobs. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
37. E.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209·11 (5th Cir. 1982) (referring interchangea-
bly to negligence and gross negligence); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 
706, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (referring to the standard as "that care which businessmen of ordi-
nary prudence use in managing their own affairs," but stating that the court will not set aside the 
board's action absent "proof of fraud or manifestly oppressive conduct"); see also Louisiana 
World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing Louisi-
ana case law); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'!, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (not ing 
inconsistencies in lexas case law); Aron son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (noting 
inconsistencies in terminology used by prior Delaware court opinions); Selheimer v. Manganese 
Corp., 224 A.2d 634, 642 (Pa. 1966) (discussing prior Pennsylvania case law); Richard B. Dyson, 
The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 367-76 (1964) (exploring the different 
standards of care and confusing language used by various jur isdictions). 
38. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6 (listing different terms used by Delaware cases 
to embody a gross negligence standard). 
39. Compare Arons on, 473 A.2d at 812 (using gross negligence to refer to a less exacting 
standard of care than simple negligence) with Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 454 
(Tunn. 1891) (referring to gross negligence as the failure to exercise ordinary care). 
40. See infra notes 48, 63, and text accompanying note 69. 
296 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:287 
1. The Good Faith Standard 
At the opposite extreme from ordinary negligence are the courts 
and writers who view the business judgment rule as commanding a 
largely subjective approach. 41 The New York trial court's opinion in 
Kamin v. American Express Compan y42 provides a good example of 
this position.43 Kamin involved a shareholders' derivative complaint 
against directors of American Express Company who approved dis-
tributing an in-kind dividend. This dividend consisted of shares of 
stock which American Express had purchased some years before as an 
investment and which had declined substantially in value. The plain-
tiffs contended the directors should have sold the shares at a loss, not 
distributed them to the stockholders. In this manner, the corporation 
could have obtained a capital-loss deduction , which would have saved 
it significant taxes.44 The court dismissed the complaint as not stating 
a cause of action. In doing so, the court set out a standard of liability 
which, from all appearances, disclaims any objective review of direc-
tors' decisions: 
Section 720(a)(l)(A) of the Business Corporation Law permits an 
action against directors for "the neglect of, or failure to perform, or 
other violation of his duties in the management and disposition of 
corporate assets committed to his charge." This does not mean that 
a director is chargeable with ordinary negligence for having made 
41. E.g., Stem v. GE , 924 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1991); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int '!, Inc., 741 
F.2d 7<17 (5th Cir. 1984); Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 
237 N.E .2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Security 'Il'ust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963); 
Swenson v. Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. a. App. 1978), rev. denied, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979); 
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872); Larry D. Soderquist , The Proper Standard for Director's 
Negligence Liability, 66 NOTRE DAME L REv. 37 (1990). 
42. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (S. Ct. 1976). 
43. Toe reader, recalling the earlier discussion of Litwin, see supra notes 27-29, may won-
der how New York court opinions could provide such extremely different views of the business 
judgment rule. This illustrates that attempting to use the business judgment rule as a standard 
for breach of duty of care liability has produced as much or more intrajurisdictional confusion as 
it has interjurisdictional divisions of authority. See also Gearhart Indus., 741 F.2d at 721 (discuss-
ing inconsistencies in Texas court interpretations of the business judgment rule). 
44. From a tax-planning standpoint the board's decision made no sense. Toe shareholders 
received a basis equal to no more than the current fair market value of the distributed stock. 
I.R.C. § 301(d) (1975). Hence, the potential for a loss deduction was destroyed for everyone. 
Nor, apparently, was the dividend tax-free to the recipient shareholders, as there is no indication 
that American Express owned enough shares for a tax-free spinoff under l.R.C. § 355. The 
board's rationale for the in-kind dividend evidently was to avoid recognizing a loss that might 
depress the price of American Express stock. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S2d at 811. How legitimate 
should be the goal of attempting to bamboozle the market (or avoid embarrassing the directors) 
in this manner seems questionable . Accordingly, the directors' decision seems no more reason-
able than the action condemned in Litwin. 
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an improper decision, or having acted imprudently. The "neglect" 
referred to in the statute is neglect of duties (i.e., malfeasance or 
nonfeasance) and not misjudgment. To allege that a director "negli-
gently permitted the declaration and payment" of a dividend with-
out alleging fraud, dishonesty or nonfeasance, is to state merely that 
a decision was taken with which one disagrees.45 
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Under this approach, a court's review of a challenged decision 
focuses largely, if not exclusively, upon the subjective motivations for 
the action. While courts use a variety of terms to identify the perti-
nent inquiry-such as the presence or absence of good faith, honesty, 
or fraud 46-the heart of the matter is whether or not the directors 
believed that what they were doing was in the best interest of the cor-
poration.47 Excluded from the courts' inquiry for the most part is any 
review of the objective reasonableness of such a belief.48 Under the 
most extreme interpretation, the business judgment rule effectively 
abolishes the duty of care for any situation in which the plaintiff chal-
lenges an action by the board. Instead, all that remains of the duty 
under this view is to avoid the sort of inattention and inactivity typi-
fied by cases such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 49 in which the 
45. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
46. E.g., Stern v. GE, 924 F.2d 472,476 (2d Cir. 1991) ("fraud or bad faith"); Security nust 
Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 4Dl, 496 (Ky. 1963) ("fraud, actual or constructive "); Swenson v. 
Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) ("good faith") , rev. denied, 254 S.E.2d 181 
(N.C. 1979). 
47. See, e.g., Stern, 924 F.2d at 478 n.8 (2d Cir. 1991) (equating bad faith with an improper 
purpose); Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C. 1993); Levitan v. Stout, 
97 F. Supp. 105, 117 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (defining actual fraud as causing intentional injury to the 
corporation for the director's own benefit and constructive fraud as acts done with no purpose to 
harm the corporation but which the directors performed in a conflict of interest); Bodell v. Gen-
eral Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (Del. Ch. 1927). 
48. As stated earlier, views of the business judgment rule as a standard for duty of care 
liability form a continuum rather than precisely defined positions. See supra text accompanying 
note 40. Toe cases following a good faith approach illustrate this point. Few unequivocally rule 
out any review of objective reasonableness . Instead, after proclaiming that directors' decisions 
are unassailable in the absence of bad faith, dishonesty, or fraud, such opinions often soften such 
statements by backpaddling in varying degrees. Some opinions, like Kamin, supplement holding 
claims limited to fraud or bad faith with a finding that the directors' decision was objectively 
reasonable (or, at least, finding the plaintiff had not shown the decision was unreasonable). 363 
N.Y.S.2d at 811; see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (stating 
that baseball team director's failure to mirror practices of other team directors was not negli-
gent). Other opinions adhering to a largely subjective approach expressly leave the door open to 
finding liability in a truly egregious case despite good motives. E.g., Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. 
Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 20-21 (1872). 
49. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
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director ignored all corporate affairs while her sons looted the 
company. 50 
2. The Gross Negligence Standard 
One middle ground between ordinary negligence and the "good 
faith only" standard is found in Delaware. The Delaware Supreme 
Court has settled, at least since the mid-1980s, on the notion that the 
business judgment rule embodies a standard of gross negligence. Del-
aware's Supreme Court announced this position in Aronson v. Lewis 
by stating that "[w]hile the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to 
describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that 
under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon 
concepts of gross negligence." 51 The Delaware Supreme Court subse-
quently reaffirmed this standard in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 52 These 
holdings remove what had been a lingering uncertainty about whether 
earlier Delaware court opinions that used language suggesting a gross 
negligence standard 53 really meant what they implied.54 While Dela-
ware thus provides the clearest and most important expression of this 
approach, the gross negligence standard extends well beyond the Del-
aware courts. 55 
50. See also Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1928) (finding that bank director s were 
so uninvolved that bank officer had little trouble embezzling funds), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 
(1929); Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (finding directors negligent for allowing 
condition to exist in which codirectors were able to earn unlawful commissions). 
51. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
52. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
53. E.g., Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349,351 (Del. Ch. 1972); Lutz v. Boas, 
171 A.2d 381,396 (Del. Ch. 1961); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 
1971) ("gross overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (De l. 1966) ("gross 
abuse of discretion") . 
54. See Arsht , supra note 25. Despite this apparent clarificat ion, there remains some con-
fusion in Delaware Chancery Court opinions as to whether the gross negligence standard applies 
only to issues regarding the process used by the directors to reach a decision, as opposed to the 
decision itself. Compare Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem . Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (applying a gross negligence test to both process and substance of decision) with In re J.P . 
Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (suggesting a weaker standard of review 
when dealing with substance of decision than with pro cess used to reach it). Because a number 
of the opinions cited by Aronson in adopting the gross negligence standard involved review of 
the substance of dire ctors ' actions, it is difficult to see the basis for arguing that the gross negli-
gence standard in Delaware applies only to review of the process used by directors. 
55. E.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins . Co., 864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C. 1993); Deal v. Johnson, 362 S.2d 
214 (Ala. 1978); Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962); Uccello 
v. Gold'N Foods, Inc., 90 N.E.2d 530 (Mass. 1950) (applying standard to directo rs of non -bank-
ing corporations); Devereux v. Berger, 284 A.2d 605 (Md. 1971). 
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This leaves two related questions: First, what exactly does the 
gross negligence standard mean, and second, how is this standard dif-
ferent from ordinary negligence? One Delaware court has said that 
"in the corporate area, gross negligence would appear to mean, 'reck-
less indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the stockholders' ... 
or actions which are 'without the bounds of reason.' "56 The reader 
may be forgiven for finding such a definition less than entirely helpful. 
In fact, it is difficult to pin a precise meaning upon the term gross 
negligence.57 This has led some to suggest that the term has no signifi-
cance58 or, put another way, gross negligence is the same thing as neg-
ligence "with the addition of a vituperative epithet. "59 Reinforcing 
this skepticism is the fact that it is not easy to find cases applying the 
gross negligence standard to directors' actions in which use of this 
standard, rather than an ordinary negligence test, unquestionably 
made a critical difference to the outcome.60 
A good example is the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom. 61 The court found the directors of Trans Union 
Corporation liable for deciding to sell the company after only a two-
hour meeting, at which they relied upon a twenty-minute oral presen-
tation concerning the transaction and did not read the merger agree-
ment or inquire into the basis for the agreed price. While the majority 
of the court found this to be gross negligence, a pointed dissent, since 
joined by other critics,62 raised questions which lead one to wonder 
whether there was even ordinary negligence here. Those disagreeing 
with the majority's conclusion point to the fact that the directors were 
highly sophisticated in business and thoroughly familiar with the com-
pany. Hence, it is doubtful if the directors really needed additional 
time or advice to assess whether the offered price was a good one, 
especially when it represented a substantial premium over market and 
when the stockholders could still vote the deal down. In any event, 
regardless of who is right or wrong as to the result in Van Gorkom, 
56. Rabkin, 547 A.2d at 970 (citation omitted). 
57. E.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 11-IE LAW OF TORTS§ 34, at 
212 (5th ed . 1984). 
58. E.g., Arsht, supra note 25, at 120 n. 119; Beveridge, supra note 25. at 924-25. But see 
Roscoe Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. Cm. L REv. 465, 486 (1958). 
59. Wilson v. Brett, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (E,cch. of Pleas 1843). 
60. See, e.g., Veasey & Manning, supra note 11, at 928; Dyson, supra note 37, at 373 n.136. 
61. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
62. E.g., Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgment R11le and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus . 
LAw. 1437 {1985). 
300 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:287 
this dispute makes it evident that the gross rather than ordinary negli-
gence label had little impact upon the result. 
Still, one should not dismiss the term gross negligence too 
quickly. Even if not amenable to precise definition, most individuals 
would have no trouble understanding that gross negligence entails 
some worse level of dereliction than ordinary negligence. 63 In fact, 
recent litigation concerning the liability of directors of failed financial 
institutions suggests there may be more significance to the gross negli-
gence label than some critics thought. Otherwise, one would be hard 
pressed to explain the plethora of reported decisions involving the 
question of whether the FDIC may assert state law claims sounding in 
ordinary negligence against directors of failed banks , or whether fed-
eral legislation limits such claims to gross negligence.64 
3. The Process-Versus-Substance Distinction 
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance provides an example of a another approach to duty of care liabil-
ity under the business judgment rule. This approach draws a 
distinction between the level of judicial scrutiny of the directors' deci-
sion itself, and review of the process the directors used to arrive at the 
63. E.g., KEE TON ET AL, supra note 57, at 211-12. In fact, the idea behind a number of 
opinions employing a gross negligence test is simply that the standard for director liability should 
require more than the ordinary negligence commonly creating tort liability, but not as much as a 
test that focuses solely on subjective motivations. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed-
eral Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1989) ("the standard ... lies somewhere between 
simple negligence and willful misconduct or fraud with intent to deceive"); Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805,812 n.6 (1984) ("director liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting 
than simple negligence"). But see Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp ., 547 A.2d 963, 971 
(Del. Ch. 1986). This again illustrates the continuum natur e of the various views of the business 
judgment rule as a standard for breach of duty of care liability. 
From a practical standpo int, the significance of a gross negligence test may be more a matter 
of altering statistical probabilities than of changing the results in any specific case. rt enough fact 
finders in enough close cases are instruct ed they may find the defendants liable only if they find 
gross rather than ordinary negligence, there will be in all likelihood a greater number of defense 
verdicts. 
64. E.g., FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. a. 516 (1992); 
FDI C v. Fay, 779 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1991); FDIC v. Williams, 779 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex. 
1991); FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1991); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919 
(W.D. Okla. 1991); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1991); FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. 
Supp. 1244 (D. Minn. 1991); FDIC v. McSweeny, 772 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Cal. 1991), affd , 976 
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. a. 2440 (1993). At issue in these cases is whether 
Section 182l(k ) of the financial Institut ions Reform , Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. I 1989))-which gives the FDIC a cause of action against grossly 
negligent directors of failed banks- preempts the agency's ability to sue under state common 
law. 
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decision . Specifically, for the business judgment rule to apply under 
section 4.0l(c) of the ALi's Principles, the director must be "informed 
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the 
director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances," but the director must only "rationally believe ... that 
the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation." 65 
The distinction between "reasonable" and "rational" in section 4.0l(c) 
is deliberate. As Comment 'd' to section 4.01 explains: 
It is recognized that the word "rational," which is widely used by 
courts, has a close etymological tie to the word "reasonable" and 
that, at times, the words have been used almost interchangeably. 
But a sharp distinction is being drawn between the words here. The 
phrase "rationally believes" is intended to permit a significantly 
wider range of discretion than the term "reasonable," and to give a 
director or o{ficer a safe harbor from liability for business judg-
ments that might arguably fall outside the term "reasonable" but 
are not so removed from the realm of reason when made that liabil-
ity should be incurred. 66 
Essentially, the ALI proposes to focus the protective thrust of the 
business judgment rule on limiting judicial scrutiny of the substance of 
the directors' decision. The ALI formulates a standard of reasonable 
belief regarding the process the directors use to reach their decision, 
or, more specifically, whether directors gathered adequate informa-
tion before acting. This would appear consistent with the norm of 
ordinary negligence.67 When it comes to the substance of the direc-
tors' decision, however, the ALi's proposed version of the business 
judgment rule lowers the standard of care to a rational belief. The 
ALI's comments suggest this rational belief standard may be similar 
to an absence of gross negligence. 68 
65. PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORA'lc GOVERNANCE, supra note 2. § 401(c). at 182 (emphasis 
added). 
66. Id. § 401 cmt. d at 185. 
67. See, e.g., Aloy v. Mash, 696 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1985) (attorney has obligation to con-
duct reasonable research before giving an opinion); Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 
(Minn. 1986) (doctor must use reasonable care to gather information needed to exercise profes-
sional judgment) . 
68. The ALI states that this rational belief test is the same approach as used by a number of 
cases applying Delaware law. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 
§ 401(c) cmt. fat 236·37. As explained earlier , Delaware apparently employs a gross negligence 
standard both as to process and result. E.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 
963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986). But see In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988), 
appeal refused , 540 A.2d 1088 (Del. 1988). 
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There are a number of variations on this process-versus-substance 
theme. All have in common, however, the notion that the business 
judgment rule calls for less judicial scrutiny of the merits of the direc-
tors' decision than of the process the directors used in arriving at the 
deterrnination. 69 One obvious extreme is to conclude that the busi-
ness judgment rule precludes any review at all of the substance of the 
decision. The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Auerbach 
v. Bennett 70 provides an example of this extreme. 
Auerbach involved the decision of a "special litigation commit-
tee." Specifically, shareholders of General Telephone & Electronics 
Corporation brought a derivative suit against directors of the com-
pany and its outside accountants. The complaint alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty in connection with so-called questionable payments 
made by the company to overseas public officials and political parties. 
In response, the board of GTE appointed a committee of three direc-
tors, who were not defendants in the derivative action, to determine 
the position the company should take regarding the suit. The commit-
tee, after some investigation, concluded the derivative suit was not in 
the best interests of the corporation and the corporation moved to 
dismiss. The court of appeals decided the appropriate response to 
such a motion was to apply the business judgment rule to the commit-
tee 's recommendation. More significant to the present discussion, the 
court then interpreted the rule to preclude any review of the sub-
stance of the committee's decision. The court explained: 
69. E.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Directors' Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Stan· 
dards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. Rev. 591, f/J7, 615 (1983) 
(duty of care emphasizes process; review of merits should be limited to whether the decision is 
consistent with a significant portion of the information possessed by the directors); Dyson, supra 
note 37, at 369-70 (business judgment rule may usefully embody the idea that diligent directors 
should not be liable for a bad decision resulting from a lack of skill rather than effort); Charles 
Hansen , The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment 
Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237 (1986) (duty of care concerns process and that results 
should not be not reviewable unless so egregious as to amount to constructive fraud); E. Norman 
Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the '!rans 
Union Case and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1486-87 (1985) 
(gross negligence is a standard for process; review of merits should be limited to abuse of discre-
tion which equals a lack of a rational business purpose); Statement of the Business Roundtable 
on the American Law Institute's Proposed "Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: 
Restatement and Recommendations," 49 (Feb. 1983) (on file with author) (Only in the excep-
tional case where the decision is so bizarre as to cast doubt on the directors ' good faith should 
the merits of the decision rather than the process used to reach it be subject to review.). 
70. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
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We turn then to the action of the special litigation committee 
itself which comprised two components. First, there was the selec-
tion of procedures appropriate to the pursuit of its charge, and sec-
ond, there was the ultimate substantive decision, predicated on the 
procedures chosen and the data produced thereby, not to pursue the 
claims advanced in the shareholders' derivative actions. The latter, 
substantive decision falls squarely within the embrace of the busi-
ness judgment doctrine, involving as it did the weighing and balanc-
ing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, fiscal 
and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if not most cor-
porate problems. To this extent the conclusion reached by the spe-
cial litigation committee is outside the scope of our review. Thus, 
the courts cannot inquire as to which factors were considered by 
that committee or the relative weight accorded them in reaching 
that substantive decision.71 
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Instead, the only review-other than as to subjective good faith-was 
to the methodologies used by the committee: "The court may properly 
inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's 
investigative procedures and methodologies." 72 
II. IS THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE A "GOOD" RULE? 
At first glance, one might be tempted to answer this question by 
saying it depends upon the interpretation given the business judgment 
rule. For example, how can one criticize a "rule" which consists of 
little more than a self-evident statement? Probably no one expects 
that directors should act as insurers against less than optimum results 
from all their decisions, any more than one expects such from doctors, 
lawyers, or others. Accordingly, few would argue with the proposition 
that the plaintiff must prove some problem of loyalty or care before 
courts will impose liability on directors. Yet, the very self-evident 
nature of such a statement suggests that labeling it as some sort of 
special rule serves little utility. 
Moreover, before assuming any problem with the business judg-
ment rule is simply one of overexpansive interpretation, it may be use-
ful to look again at the honest error in judgment rule. In the medical-
malpractice area, questions about that rule have arisen in the context 
of defendants ' requests for instructions to the jury that they are not 
liable for "an honest error in judgment." A growing number of courts 
71. Id. at 1002. 
72. Id. 
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have held such an instruction should not be given.73 The principal 
concern is that such an instruction can confuse the jurors into focusing 
on the doctor's subjective good intentions rather than on whether the 
doctor's conduct corresponded to an objective standard of care. 74 The 
history of the business judgment rule suggests lay jurors are not the 
only ones who can become confused into focusing upon subjective 
good intentions by this sort of language. Yet, there may be a greater 
problem here than simply the language used. There seems to be 
something in the human mind which rebels at the notion that anything 
labeled a "rule" could have little or no significance. Hence, it may be 
impossible to confine a phrase entitled "the business judgment rule" 
to standing only for a caution concerning the nature of negligence. 
Accordingly, the desirability of the business judgment rule rests 
on one fundamental question : Should directors' liability require a 
showing of greater fault than ordinary negligence? In addressing this 
question one must start with the presumption that the standard of 
ordinary negligence is correct because it is the norm throughout the 
law of torts. 75 It is also the norm when dealing with the duty of care of 
agent to principal. 76 Accordingly, the burden exists on those who 
would establish a different standard for director liability-whether it 
is good faith only, gross negligence, or a focus on process rather than 
substance-to justify the special treatment. 
A. EXAMINING THE JUSTIFI C ATIONS FOR INSULATING DIRECTORS 
FROM LIABILITY FOR ORDINARY NEGLIGEN CE 
Over the years, numerous courts and writers have recited a vari-
ety of justifications for the business judgment rule insulating directors 
from liability for ordinary negligence. These rationales fall into four 
broad categories explored below. The difficulty with these arguments 
is generally not that they lack any truth. On the contrary, the primary 
73. E.g., Demmer v. Patt, 788 F.2d 1387 (8th Cir. 1986); Somer v. Johnson , 704 F.2d 1473 
(11th Cir . 1983); Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1990); Wall v. Stout, 311 S.E . 2d 571 
(N.C. 1984); Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp ., 772 P.2d 929 (Or . 1989); Teh Len Chu v. Fairfax 
Emergency Medical Assocs., 290 S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1982). 
74. [T]o use such a phrase in a charge upon negligence serves only to confuse a jury by 
implying that only an error in judgment made in bad faith can be actionable. The cen-
tral issue in the ordinary negligence case is whether the defendant has deviated from 
the required standard of reasonable care, not his mental state at the time of the 
conduct. 
Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn . 1983). 
75. E.g., KEETON ET AL ., supra note 57, at 161, 173. 
76. See, e.g .• RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 379(1) (1984) (stating that agent has 
a duty to act with care and skill that is standard in the locality for the kind of work). 
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problem is that these rationales prove too much, for they could apply 
with equal force to numerous other situations in which the rule of 
ordinary negligence commonly applies. 
1. Difficulties with After-the-Fact Review of Business Decisions 
The most traditional arguments for insulating directors from lia-
bility for ordinary negligence center upon the difficulties which can 
attend after-the-fact judicial review of business decisions. These argu-
ments often begin with the observation that because business deci-
sions involve taking risks, many decisions by directors end up 
producing a loss for the company.77 Such an observation, however, 
hardly distinguishes business decisions from decions in numerous 
other contexts, such as medicine or law, which often involve taking 
calculated risks and in which many decisions will also produce harm or 
loss.78 More fundamentally, this observation is not inconsistent with 
the premises underlying the negligence standard. Specifically, the 
mere fact that a decision involves taking risks or ultimately results in a 
loss does not make the decision negligent. 79 Spinning off from Judge 
Hand's famous fonnula, 80 if the magnitude of gain expected from a 
board decision, multiplied by the probability measured ex ante of 
achieving the gain, exceeds the magnitude of loss risked by the deci-
sion, multiplied by the probability of the loss, than the decision pre-
sumably is reasonable. 81 Accordingly, a negligence standard should 
77. E.g., Smith v. Brown·Borhek Co., 200 A.2d 398,401 (Pa . 1964); William F. Kennedy, 
The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 624, 644 (1984). 
78. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
80. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that liability 
depends upon whether the burden of prevention is less than the probab ility of the accident 
multiplied by the severity of the injury). 
81. Stated algebraically: if Pg x Mg > Pl x Ml, then the decision is reasonable (where Pg = 
probability of gain; Mg = magnitude of gain; Pl = probability of loss; and Ml = magnitude of 
loss) . More realistically, there can be a number of potential outcomes from a business decision. 
In that case, the formula becomes: if (Pg1 x Mg,) + (Pgi x Mgi)+ ... + (Pg. x Mg.,) > (Pl, x Ml1) + 
(Ph x Mh) + ..• + (Pl. x MI.). then the decision is reasonable (where Pg1 thr ough Pl. and Mg, 
through MI. are the probabilities and magnitudes of the various possible outcomes). This 
approach is perhaps simplistic because it treats any decision yielding a positive net expected 
return as reasonable without regard to how the expected return would compare with other 
investments of similar risk. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relation-
ship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U . L. REV. 1045, 1062-64 (1991) 
(suggesting that the failure to invest so as to achieve an expected return commensurate with risk 
as measured by the market "risk-return frontier" can breach a fiduciary's duty of care). None -
theless, the point remains that there is nothing presumptively negligent about taking risks. One 
might also note that the Hand formula actually works better when dealing with business risks 
than with accidents. With business risks, there is no need to put a dollar figure on the magnitude 
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neither deter the taking of desirable risks nor punish simply bad 
results . 
The problem, however, is that this sort of formula is easier to 
recite than actually to apply in an after-the-fact judicial proceeding. 
Such a proceeding is neither infallible nor cost-free. Rather, there is 
always the concern that a fact finder with the benefit of hindsight will 
confuse bad results with an unreasonable decision.82 Moreover, even 
if the defendant prevails, victory may come only after expensive litiga-
tion.83 Accordingly, the argument often goes, without protection from 
liability for ordinary negligence, directors have an incentive to avoid 
potentially more desirable higher-risk activities in favor of less profita-
ble but more guaranteed undertakings .84 
of loss from personal injury nor to consider whether one party 's cost savings from neglecting 
accident prevention should constitute a socially acceptable excuse for injuring another party 
without paying compensation. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J . 
L EGAL STIJO. 151, 158 (1973). 
82. E.g., Eisenberg , supra note 32, at 963. 
83. E.g., David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 
G EO. WASH. L. REv. 653. 683 (1914). 
84. The court in Joy v. North , 692 F.2d 880, 886 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied , 460 U.S. 
1051 (1983), gives the following example: 
Consider the choice between two investments in an example adapted from KLErN, 
BusrNES S 0ROAN[ZATION AND FINANCE 147-49 (1980): 
Estimated 
Probability 
of Outcome 
.4 
.4 
.2 
1.0 
Estimated 
Probabili ty 
of Outcome 
.4 
.4 
.2 
INVESTMENT A 
Outcome 
Profit or 
Loss 
+15 
+ 1 
-13 
INVESTMENT B 
Outcome 
Profit or 
Loss 
+6 
+2 
+l 
Value 
6.0 
.4 
-2.6 
3.8 
Value 
2.4 
.8 
.2 
LO 3.4 
Although A is clearly "worth" more than B. it is riskier because it is more volatile. 
Diversification lessens the volatility by allowing investors to invest in 20 or 200 A's 
which will tend to guarantee a total result near the value. Shareholders are thus better 
off with the various firms selecting A over B, although after the fact they will complain 
in each case of the 2.6 loss. If the courts did not abide by the business judgment rule, 
they might well penalize the choice of A in each such case and thereby unknowingly 
injure shareholders generally by creating incentives for management always to choose 
B. 
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Yet, in itself, this argument also does not distinguish business 
decisions from decisions in medicine, law, or a myriad of other under-
takings to which the standard of ordinary negligence applies . Indeed, 
this line of reasoning is part of complaints by doctors and various 
other groups of prospective defendants who assert that the high cost 
of even a successful defense and the propensity of fact finders to con-
fuse bad results with negligence have created a "malpractice crisis" 
and a need to reform the tort system.85 Hence, if one is to defend a 
business judgment rule that embodies a different standard of liability 
for directors, one must point to ways in which after-the-fact judicial 
review of business decisions poses greater difficulty than found in 
other areas. Specifically, the burden exists to show that there is a 
greater prospect for error in assessing the reasonableness of a business 
decision or that incentives to avoid risk pose some greater harm when 
dealing with business decisions. Those who defend a different stan-
dard for directors have made both claims. 
Courts and writers have pointed to two factors which might make 
after-the-fact judicial review of business decisions more prone to erro-
neous factual conclusions than review of decisions in other areas. To 
begin with, judges and juries generally are not business experts. 86 Yet, 
this perceived lack of competence has not prevented exacting judicial 
review under the intrinsic-fairness test of business decisions in which 
directors have a conflict of interest. 87 More fundamentally, such lack 
of judicial expertise does not distinguish business decisions from 
medicine88 and innumerable other fields89 in which the negligence sys-
tem holds sway. 
As stated before, Investment A should not result in liability under an ordinary negligence stan-
dard even if it produces the -13 loss. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The concern lies 
with erron eous findings of liability and the expense of a successful defense. 
85. E.g., William J. Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. 
L. REv. 533, 591 (1959) (stating that the professionals' most disturbing fear regarding malprac-
tice liability is that the law will call them to account simply because the result obtained was bad); 
David Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma , 1975 DUKE L.J. 
1179, 1181-83; Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Stat-
utory and Contractual Alt erations, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. P~_oes. 125 (1986). 
86. E.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch.), appeal refused, 540 A.2d 
1089 (Del. 1988); Auerbach v. Bennett , 719 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement , 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1982); Bayless Manning, The 
Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 622 (1984). 
87. E.g., Tamar Frankel , Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's 
Project 011 Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 705, 715 (1984). 
88. See, e.g., Cross v. Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) (holding that proof of 
medical malpractic e requires expert witness) . 
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If judicial expertise cannot justify different treatment, perhaps 
there is something about the nature of business decisions which ren-
ders review more speculative. A number of courts and writers have 
made the argument that each business decision is unique, heavily intu-
itive, and judgmental. These qualities, such courts and writers assert, 
both undermine the accuracy of after-the-fact review and are not true 
of other fields.90 For example, the principal reporter for the ALI Cor-
porate Governance Project argued in a recent article that medical, 
unlike business, decisions involve established protocols which can 
guide both fact finders in accurately determining negligence and pro-
spective defendants in avoiding the same.91 
There are a couple of difficulties with this argument. First and 
foremost, it is factually wrong. For one thing, the very existence of 
extensive formal business education would seem to contradict the 
notion that no norms guide the making of business decisions.92 The 
idea that business decisions represent an intuitive swamp entirely 
beyond the ken of later reviewers seems especially questionable for 
actions at the board of directors level. Since directors act as a board, 
their decisions involve group deliberations rather than a single indi-
vidual's unarticulated intuitive judgment, as might be the case with 
other professionals. 93 
89. See, e.g., 530 East 89 Corp. v. Unger , 373 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 1977) (architectural prac-
tice); Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 261 S.E.2d 50 (S.C . 1979) (accounting) . 
90. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. de11ied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); 
Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000 (N.Y. 1979); Veasey & Manning, supra note 11. at 932. 
91. Eisenberg, supra note 32, at %3-64. 
92. E.g., J. Gordon Christy, Corporate Mismanagement As Malpractice: A Critical Reanal· 
ysis of Corporate Managers' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L. R.Ev. 105 (1984). For 
el(ample, one of the common areas involving board approval, and a frequent source of legal 
challenges to the board's decision, is the buying and selling of businesses or major business 
assets. E.g., Cohn, supra note 69, at 596-97. Here, one of the primary issues is price. E.g., 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 796-804 (1991). While business valuation is cer-
tainly more of an art than a science, to say it is an art without any establisbed guidelines or 
methodologies is to ignore huge quantities of available literature. E.g., HAROLD BIERMAN, JR. 
ET AL., OuANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS (8th ed. 1991); ARTHUR s. DEWING, 
FINANCIAL POLICY O F CORPORATIONS (5th ed . 1953); EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, 
THE THEORY OF FINANCE (1972); DENNISE. LOGUE, HANDBOOI< OF MODERN FINANCE (2d ed. 
1990); JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND Poucv (5th ed. 1980); J. FRED 
WESTON & EUOENE F. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE (4th ed. 1972). 
93. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers , Jr ., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in 
Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REv . 1, 6-7 (1980). This is not to say that group deliberations yield 
better results; merely that there is more likely to be an articulated rationale or rationales for the 
group's action. The fact that directors act as a group may raise causation questions concerning a 
particular director's liability, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826-29 (N.J. 
1981), and also may raise questions concerning the reasonableness of reliance upon others, e.g., 
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If business decisions are not completely an unreviewable guess-
work swamp, it is even more a myth to suppose medical or other pro-
fessional decisions have been routinized down to the scientific 
application of accepted protocols. For example, most doctors will 
admit that a certain percentage of their patients are "not in the book," 
by which doctors mean the patients' complaints and symptoms do not 
fall into any familiar categories of diagnosis and treatment. While dif-
ferent doctors place the proportion of such patients at different levels, 
this level may be as high as eighty-five percent. 94 With regard to the 
legal profession, one of the primary goals of law school is to prepare 
students to deal with situations where there is substantial uncer-
tainty.95 Even in accounting, the California Supreme Court recently 
noted how auditing is a complex process requiring discretion and 
judgment at every stage.96 In fact, law, medicine, business, and other 
professions may be largely alike in that they involve a substantial 
degree of what one author has labeled "knowing in action." In other 
words, the professional undertakes actions in unique situations based 
upon intuition and experience, without being able to articulate the 
exact reason for the course of action.97 To the extent this sort of intui-
tive "knowing in action" does not lend itself to an accurate after-the-
fact judicial assessment of reasonableness, then perhaps there is a 
need to rethink the standards of malpractice generally. Such tort-law 
reform is well beyond the scope of this Article. The important point 
for present purposes is that business decisions do not represent a dis-
tinctly intuitive field in a way which renders them particularly inap-
propriate for judicial review; on the contrary, business decisions are 
very similar in this regard to decisions by other professionals. 
Yet, even if it was true that business decisions are more judgmen-
tal and leave less guidance for later reviewers than found in other 
fields, this assertion would not justify the conclusion that directors 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1985). It does not, however, explain why there 
should be a lower standard of care. 
94. DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN 
ACTION 16 (1983); see also Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care is 
the Important Standard, 49 LA w & CoNTEMP. PROSS. 321, 329 (l 986)(measuring the quality of 
medical care is especially difficult given that medicine is as much an art as a science and given 
the complexities of the human organism); Mechanic, supra note 85, at 1182 (stating that stan-
dards of medical practice are ambiguous). 
95. E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 92, at 20; RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SM1lH, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE 811-12 (3d ed. 1989); James Boyd White, Law Teacher's Writing, 91 M1cH. 
L. REv. 1970, 1972 (1993); see also infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
96. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). 
97. SCHON, supra note 94, at 49-50. 
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need added insulation from liability for ordinary negligence. To 
understand why, it is useful to consider the area of legal malpractice . 
One part of legal practice which is especially intuitive and judgmental 
is trial strategy . What prospective jurors to excuse, what witnesses to 
call, what questions to ask ( or not ask), what objections to forgo, what 
areas to emphasize in opening and closing arguments, and, indeed, 
what overall theory of the case to pursue are all subjects upon which 
the attorney must exercise judgment guided in large part by intuition 
and experience (and often with little or no time for reflection) .98 If, in 
fact, highly judgmental areas are particularly prone to judicial second 
guessing that confuses bad results with negligence, then one would 
expect such trial decisions to be the grist for innumerable legal mal-
practice suits . This is especially true given that trials inevitably pro-
duce losers, thereby providing a steady stream of prospective 
malpractice plaintiffs. Yet, challenges to trial decisions do not consti-
tute the predominant source of legal malpractice claims99 and are 
rarely successful.100 It is not difficult to deduce why. The more judg-
mental and less subject to consensus a given decision is, the more diffi-
cult it is for the plaintiff to prove a given decision was unreasonable, 
much less that a different decision necessarily would have produced a 
better result. 101 
This raises an important point missed by those who worry that a 
lack of accepted protocols or guidelines for business decisions will 
leave directors too much at risk under an ordinary negligence stan-
dard. This point is that a lack of guidelines for determining the rea-
sonableness of actions most hurts the party with the burden of 
proof-the plaintiff. The experience with trial attorneys also suggests 
that an ordinary negligence standard would not mean directors would 
face a lawsuit every time they made a decision .102 
98. E.g., RoeERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELEcnNo A JURY 5 (1979); John W. Davis, 
Forward to FRANCIS LEWIS WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS·EXAMINATION at xiii (4th ed . 1936); 
Gary Goodpaster , The Trial for Life : Effect ive Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 
N.Y .U. L. REV. 299, 343 (1983). 
99. E.g., MALLEN & SMITH, supra not e 95, at 157 (stating that missed time limitations make 
up the largest source of legal malpractice claims; most litigation related legal malpractice claims 
relat e to ministerial , non-judgmental errors) . 
100. E.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 n.l (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U .S. 
888 (1980) (unaware of any decision holding an attorney liable for the choice of trial tactics) . 
101. See, e.g., Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. Ct. App . 1976). 
102. For an assertion that applying convention al ton standards to directors ' decisions will 
yield boundless litigation , see Kennedy , supra note n, at 630-31. 
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If there is nothing about business decisions which makes an after-
the-fact judicial review of reasonableness inherently less accurate than 
in other areas, one could still argue that deterrence of risk taking cre-
ates greater harm in the business context. 103 Yet, there is little basis 
for such an argument. True, risk taking is important in business. But 
it is also important in medicine, law, and a host of other fields. For 
example, anyone who has been through the experience of discussing 
surgery in a doctor 's office comes to realize that medical treatment 
inherently involves the taking of calculated risks.104 The same is true 
when deciding litigation and trial strategy and throughout much of the 
practice of law.105 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an area in which 
decisions do not involve a balancing of risks.106 
Admittedly, the ultimate decision to take risks in the medical or 
legal fields normally lies with the patient or client.107 Accordingly, 
one might argue that medical and legal professionals can insulate 
themselves from liability by obtaining informed consent.108 Such an 
argument, however, misunderstands the role of informed consent in 
malpractice litigation. Patients who have suffered injury by virtue of 
arguably reasonable treatment have used the lack of their informed 
consent as an independent basis for recovery.109 One cannot find 
cases, however, in which doctors have been able to use their patients' 
consent to prevent liability for an unreasonable choice of treatment. 110 
103. E.g., Veasey & Manning , supra note 11, at 931-32. 
104. E.g., STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATIONS OF THE SENATE 
CoMM. ON Gov 'T OPERATIONS, 9lsT CoNo., 1ST SESS., MEDJC.:AL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT 
VERSUS TiiE PHYSICIAN 453-56 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter SENATE SuBCOMM.]; see also 
Robert H. Brooks et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Core, 
1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1209 (stating that the increasing effectiveness of modem medical therapies 
also has increased their possibilities of doing harm to the patient); Glen 0. Robinson, The Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s: A Retrospective, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoes. 5, 11-12 (1986) 
(same). 
105. E.g., Ro eERT E . KEETON, TRIAL-TACTICS AND M Entoos 96-98 (2d ed. 1973); see also 
infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
106. E.g., KEETON ET AL-., supra note 57, at 179; see also Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., 
The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidenrs and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 
239, 255 (1967) (pointing out that excessively cautious driving itself creates safety hazards). 
107. E.g., Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561 (D .C. App. 1982). 
108. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 964 n.53. 
109. E.g., Cobbs v. Grant , 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Miller v. Yan Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143 (Colo. 
Ct. App . 1980); Sard v. Hardy , 379 A .2d 1014 (Md. 1977). 
110. Nor is it realistic to suggest that professionals can use the consent process to avoid 
exercising any judgment by laying out all the options and all the relevant learning about each 
option and then letting the patient or client play doctor or lawyer. The patient or client typically 
wants a recommendation-that is what one employs the professional for. This is why the cases 
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Moreover, directors concerned about a particularly risky decision 
could seek consent from the shareholders. 111 
Overall, the concern that liability for ordinary negligence will 
deter directors from taking worthwhile risks sounds remarkably like 
the lament of doctors who complain that the threat of malpractice 
suits has forced them to engage in "defensive medicine" with the 
result of unnecessarily increased costs112 and the avoidance of worth-
while but more risky medical treatments. 113 Similar laments can be 
heard coming from other professionals faced with liability for negli-
gence.114 The concern about director liability and risk taking may well 
be valid. It is not, however, unique. 
2. Nature of the Damages 
A second group of arguments made in favor of a special standard 
of liability for directors focuses on the damages suffered by the corpo-
ration. Specifically, some writers have attempted to justify such a 
standard by noting that, unlike medical malpractice or many other 
torts which cause physical injuries, director gaffes cause only mone-
tary loss.115 In addition, a number of writers have expressed concern 
about the potentially huge dollar losses which a director's decision 
speak of informed consent---<:onsent to a recommended procedure-rather than informed selec-
tion of a procedure by the patient. E.g., Sard, 379 A.2d at 1020 (Md. 1977) (holding that there is 
a duty to disclose nature of "proposed treatment"). In addition, even if consent can avoid a 
malpractice claim for the choice of a procedure, it still leaves the physician at risk to a claim of 
negligently carrying out the procedure. This, in tum, can create an incentive to avoid higher-risk 
procedures where a jury might confuse a bad outcome with negligent performance. 
111. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that share-
holders can ratify negligence). Much like the situation with other professionals, attempts by 
directors to seek consent may raise issues of full disclosure and may not be practical. Compare 
id. at 890-93 (holding that directors must disclose germane facts) with Crain, 443 A.2d at 558 
(holding that physicians had to disclose material risks). See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 10-
12 (holding that a doctor may forgo obtaining informed consent of a patient in an emergency or 
when disclosure of all risks otherwise might be detrimental to the patient's health). 
112. E.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Rethin/cjng the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks 
Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas. 173, 176-77 (1986) (citing surveys 
in which between 50,70 percent of all physicians claim to practice defensive medicine and an 
AMA estimate that the annual cost of defensive medicine exceeds $15 billion). 
113. E.g., SENATE SuBCOMM., supra note 104, at 6-7, 453; James W. Brooke, Medical Mal-
pracrice: A Socio-Economic Problem from a Doctors (sic) View, 6 WtLLAMETrE L.J. 225, 231 
(1970); Brooks et al., supra note 104, at 1213, 1217; Bovbjerg, supra note 94, at 324. 
114. E.g., Donna R.H. Walters, New Liabiliry Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants Scurrying, 
L.A. TtMEs, Mar. 29, 1992, at Dl. 
115. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 964. 
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could cause.116 This, in turn, leads to the assertion that liability for 
such large amounts could deter qualified individuals from serving on 
boards 117-especially given the relatively small compensation 
received by outside directors.118 
It is difficult to find justification in such arguments for a different 
standard of liability for directors. Directors are hardly unique among 
prospective tort defendants in that their negligence is likely to cause 
economic loss rather than physical injury. To name one obvious 
group, the same could be said of attorneys.119 
Neither is the concern about the size of damage awards unique to 
directors. Doctors and other professionals have repeatedly expressed 
similar concerns about the size of awards against them .120 In fact, a 
comparison of actual awards against negligent directors versus other 
professionals might suggest directors have little to complain about. 121 
116. E.g., Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liabiliry for Negligence, 
1972 D UKE L.J. 895, 898; Kennedy, supra note 77, at 643. 
117. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 200 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. 1964). 
118. This, however, would not explain application of the business judgment rule to well com-
pensated management directors. Moreover, any notion that the standard of care should be pro-
portional to the amount of compensation is inconsistent with general principles of tort law. See, 
e.g., Le Juene Road Hosp. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1965). 
119. E.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975) (involving person's loss of interest in 
retirement plan as a result of her attorney 's negligence); see also Spherex , Inc. v. Alexander 
Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982) (involving an accountant's negligence that resulted in a 
financial loss for a creditor who made a loan in reliance on negligently prepared financial state-
ments); City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1974) (involving an engineer 's negli-
gence that cost the city money to redo an intake system). 
120. E.g., Bill Winter, Medical Malpractice: Will Jumbo Awards Spark Another Insurance 
Crisis, 68 A.B.A. J. 1545, 1546 (1982); Lee Berton , Price Waterhouse Damage Award Fuels 
Industry 's Campaign to Limit Liability , WALL ST. J., May 21, 1992, at A3. 
121. After reviewing the judicial decisions in which directors were held liable for negligent 
mismanagement-rather than for inattention or conflict of intere st-a 1983 art icle found the 
highest award was only $547,021. and this award was subject to contribution among sixteen 
defendant directors . Cohn, supra note 69, at 629 n.189. Part of the reason for this is that difficul-
ties in proving causation often cut off the more extreme damage claims against directors. Id. at 
629; see also Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F.2d 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (holding that the plaintiff failed to 
show that the director's neglect caused business losses). By way of comparison, the average 
award in a medical malpractice case in 1980 was $404,726, in 1985 almost $1.2 million, and in 
1986, almost $1.5 million. The highest verdict in each of these years was approximately $6.7 
million, $12.7 million, and $15.8 million, respectively. Note, The Applicabiliry of Experience Rat-
ing to Medical Malpractice Insurance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 255, 260 n.37 (1987). Multimil-
lion dollar awards against negligent attorneys also have become increasingly common. E.g., 
Malpractice Update, 12 CAL. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 78 (reporting verdicts of $8.2, $2.7, and $1 
million). Recently, an Arizona jury returned a verdict against the accounting finn of Price, 
Waterhou se for $338 million based upon negligent audits of a bank (although this verdict was 
subseque ntly set aside for other reasons). Black Days for A ccounting Firms, WALL ST. J., May 
22, 1992, at AlO. 
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Moreover, the threat that large awards will drive individuals from ser-
vice on boards of directors finds its parallel among like claims by med-
ical and other professionals. For instance, some argue that the cost of 
malpractice suits is driving individuals away from certain areas of 
medical practice 122 or many small accounting firms out of auditing. 123 
In any event, if potentially draconian damage awards are the problem, 
the logical solution does not lie in fiddling with the standard of liabil-
ity. Instead, the solution would be to limit the amount of recovery. 124 
This, in fact, has been an approach followed by a number of states 
when dealing with the concerns of doctors.125 
3. Nature of the Plaintiff 
A third group of arguments in favor of less liability for directors 
centers on the nature of the plaintiff in a derivative suit. Several fac-
tors generally make the shareholder who brings such a suit a less than 
sympathetic victim. To begin with, normally the shareholder has vol-
untarily entered into the relationship with the directors .126 After all, 
no one forced the shareholder to buy stock, and the stockholders as a 
whole were the people who elected the board . Accordingly, if share-
holders do not like the way the directors manage their company, they 
may either elect someone else or sell out. Further, according to cur-
rently popular financial theory, shareholders should protect them-
selves against the risks of mismanagement in any one company by 
holding a diversified portfolio of stock.127 Finally, the plaintiff in a 
derivative suit often is a fairly nominal shareholder who is serving pri-
marily as a front for an attorney pursuing the action for the sake of 
f ees.128 This fact, in turn, raises suspicions that plaintiffs may bring 
actions alleging a breach of the duty of care on only a slender basis 
and when the suit is not in the best interest of the corporation. 129 
122. E.g., Bovbjerg, supra note 94, at 324; Andrew H. Malcolm, Fear of Malpractice Suits 
Spurring Some Doctors to Lea1,1e Obstetrics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1985, at Al. 
123. Lee Berton , Legal-Liability Awards are Frightening Small CPA Firms Away from 
Audits, WALL ST. J ., Mar. 3, 1992, at Bl. 
124. E.g., Conard , supra note 116, at 914. Virginia has done this for directors of its corpora-
tions. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1989). 
125. E.g. , CAL C1v. Coo e § 3333.2 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (1990); UTAH 
Cooe ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1992); W. VA. CooE § SS-7B-8 (Supp . 1992). 
126. E.g., Joy v. North , 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir . 1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); 
LATTIN, supra note 25, at 277. 
127. E.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; Phillips, supra note 83, at 701-02. 
128. E.g., John C. Coffee, Ir. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An 
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform , 81 CoLUM. L. Rev . 261, 316 (1981). 
129. E.g., Fischel , supra note 62, at 1443. 
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Each of these arguments, however, has a number of shortcom-
ings. Toe fact that shareholders have entered into a voluntary rela-
tionship with the directors is not different from most situations 
involving malpractice claims. Toe same is generally true of patients 
with doctors, clients with attorneys, and a host of other situations out 
of which negligence actions may arise.13° Indeed, to suggest that a 
voluntary relationship decreases the standard of care stands the his-
torical development of tort Jaw on its head.131 Even today, in a 
number of contexts such as law or accounting, privity (a voluntary 
contractual relationship) remains an important, if not necessary, fac-
tor in establishing any duty of care at all.132 Moreover, the voluntary 
aspect of the relationship cuts both ways. Just as no one forced the 
shareholders to buy their stock or elect the directors, no one forced 
the directors to take the job .133 
Toe argument regarding diversification is more sophisticated, but 
ultimately is not more persuasive. To begin with, owning a portfolio 
of stocks only dilutes, but does not eliminate, the effects of misman-
agement on the individual shareholder.134 In addition, the ability to 
protect oneself from director negligence by diversification is not 
entirely unique. Individuals dealing with doctors or other profession-
als can, and often do, get a second opinion on various judgment calls. 
More broadly, medical and disability insurance cushion the financial 
risk from personal injury much as diversification cushions the loss 
from bad investments. Admittedly, there are practical limits on the 
ability to always get a second opinion whenever dealing with a profes-
sional or to fully insure against injury. Similarly, not every investor 
can or will hold an efficiently diversified portfolio of stocks.135 This is 
particularly the case when dealing with closely held corporations, 
130. See, e.g., KEET ON ET AL., supra note 57, at 660-61. 
131. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
132. E.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 
N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982). 
133. E.g., LATIIN, supra note 25, at 274. 
134. Diversification can only provide full protection against bad results from a director deci-
sion that had a net positive expected return (in other words, a decision that should not be consid· 
ered negligent, see supra note 81). In that case, the positive actual returns from those decisions 
that pan out should eventually more than offset the losses from those that, because of bad luck, 
fail. See supra note 84. On the other hand, if directors negligently make decisions with a net 
negative expected return. diversification can at best dilute the losses. 
135. E.g., James D. Cox, Compensatwn , Deterrence, and the Market As Boundaries for 
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 745, 752 (1984). 
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where it is quite common for shareholders to tie up a substantial per-
centage of their wealth in the stock of one company.136 Moreover, 
whatever one thinks of the acumen of the numerous investors who do 
not diversify, it seems questionable whether courts should gear rules 
of law to demand that individuals follow a particular investment 
strategy . 
Most fundamentally , however, the diversification argument 
proves too much. Holding diversified portfolios also dilutes the indi-
vidual stockholder 's risk from any given company becoming the victim 
of breaches of contract by those the company does business with, of 
illegal trade practices by the firm's competitors , of tortious activities 
by those outside the firm, or of other conduct which might harm and 
create a cause of action in favor of a corporation . Does anyone sug-
gest the law abolish the ability of corporations to bring lawsuits, since 
their stockholders could always diversify to minimize such risks? The 
diversification argument-indeed, the whole cluster of arguments 
which focus on the plaintiff shareholder-ignores the fact that one of 
the original purposes for creating the legal fiction of corporate entities 
was to allow an entity to have rights and assert causes of action 
independent of its owners.137 
This fact is often obscured because shareholders suing deriva-
tively on behalf of the corporation bring many, if not most, suits 
asserting director negligence.138 This makes it very tempting to attack 
perceived abuses in derivative suits by creating special liability rules, 
such as a business judgment rule , which insulates directors from liabil-
ity for ordinary negligence. It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that liability rules will affect actions which are not shareholder deriva-
tive suits, such as when a trustee in bankruptc y139 or even the corpora-
tion 's elected management 14 0 decide to sue. Accordingly, if there is a 
136. E.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co ., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975). 
137. E.g., LATIIN, supra note 25, at 65. 
138. E.g., WILLIAM D. KLEIN & JOHN C. Co FFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 143 (4th ed. 1990). 
139. E.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J . 1981). 
140. E.g., H olland v. Ame rican Founder s Life Ins . Co., 376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962); John C. 
Coffee, Jr ., Lit igation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis , 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 789, 805 n.40 (1984) (reporting a suit by Chase Manhattan Bank 
aga inst former senior officers for negligently accepting loans without adequate documentat ion ). 
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problem with shareholder derivative suits, the answer lies in attacking 
the problem directly. 141 
4. Utility of Compensation or Deterrence 
The final series of arguments made in favor of limiting the liabil-
ity of directors for negligence-even, according to some writers, to the 
point of abolishing any claim for breach of the duty of care 142 -
involve an analysis of the economic utility of liability in this context. 
This analysis takes as a given the two goals often expressed for tort 
recovery: compensation and deterrence. 143 
A number of writers have argued that director liability for negli-
gence poorly serves the goal of compensating corporations injured by 
such negligence. 144 As a factual matter, recovery rarely comes from 
the negligent directors themselves. Rather, if there is a settlement, 
the corporation often will indemnify the directors. 145 Alternately , lia-
bility insurance purchased by the corporation for its directors and 
officers commonly funds the payment. In the former instance, all that 
happens is that money makes a circuit as the corporation pays for its 
own recovery by indemnifying the defendants. Yet, it is not that sim-
ple or harmless since, as the money makes this circuit, much of it is 
lost to transaction costs such as attorneys fees, which the corporation 
also pays. 
With liability insurance the loop is longer, but exists nevertheless 
as the insurance company uses premiums paid by corporations 
purchasing policies for their directors and officers to fund recovery. 
Of course, in this instance, it is not solely the recovering corporation 
which pays. Instead, all companies purchasing policies for their 
officers and directors have paid premiums. This is the risk-spreading 
141. For one approach see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corporation? In 
Search of a Better Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. Prrr. 
L. REV. 265 (1985). 
142. E.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the Ameri can Law Institute Corporate 
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 'l27, 9'37 (1983). 
143. E.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Appr oach to Nonfault Allocation 
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); see also Stephen D. Sugarman , Doing Away with Tort 
Law, 73 CAL L. REV. 558, 559 (1985) (listing deterrence , compensation, and justice goals). 
144. E.g., Conard, supra note 116, at 909-12. 
145. Corporations statutes commonly allow companies to indemnify their directors for 
expenses incurred in defending derivative actions brought against the directors and, subject 
under many statutes to court approval , for sums paid to settle such actions. E.g .. CAL CoRP. 
ConE § 317(c) (West 1990); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw 
§ 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993). But see M.B.C.A. § 8.Sl(e) (stating that corporation cannot 
indemnify payments made to itself in a settlement). 
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function of insurance. the advantage of which is that unpredictable 
large losses typically produce a disproportionately greater harm than 
predictable small expenditures. 146 Some writers have questioned 
whether this risk-spreading function is important in the corporate con-
text given the ability of shareholders to limit risk by holding a diversi-
fied portfolio of stocks.147 This harkens back to the diversification 
argument discussed earlier. 148 More fundamentally, however, risk 
spreading does not require courts to impose liability on directors. If 
enough corporations desire to insure against losses resulting from 
unreasonable director decisions, presumably they can voluntarily buy 
policies which do so.149 
In any event, even if recovery does not come from indemnity or 
insurance, it is open to debate just how desirable it is for directors to 
compensate their corporation. For one thing, corporations probably 
have more money than their directors and thus can better afford the 
loss. Moreover, directors may be poor at spreading the risk since they 
do not work for a large number of corporations. 150 
One could, of course, quibble with portions of this sort of analy-
sis. For example, statutes which allow a corporation to indemnify its 
directors for payments the directors agree to make to the corporation 
seem rather silly. Accordingly, maybe the problem lies with such stat-
utes, rather than with director liability.151 
The fundamental problem with this whole line of reasoning, how-
ever, is not its invalidity, but rather its universality. Similar arguments 
provide the underpinnings for various no-fault proposals made to 
replace the negligence system in areas such as automobile acci-
dents.152 The fact of the matter is that as a scheme solely for compen-
sation ( at least in the sense of avoiding financial hardship due to 
accidents), tort recovery is inefficient and probably makes little sense. 
146. E.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 517-19 (1961). 
147. E.g., Coffee, supra note 140, at 806; Phillips , supra note 83, at 7(12 n.177. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 134-37. 
149. Coffee , supra note 140, at 805. 
150. Id. at 802. 
151. In fact, the most recent version of the Model Business Corporation Act does away with 
such circular payments . M.B.C.A . § 8.51 cmt. 5 (1992). 
152. E.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR 'THE TRAF-
FIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 1-3 (1965); STATE OF N.Y. 
INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? A REPORT TO GOVERNOR 
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 17-44 (1970). 
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The transaction costs to achieve compensation are high and compen-
sation depends on fault rather than need .153 A more efficient way to 
achieve compensation is simply for individuals to purchase medical, 
disability and property-loss insurance, supplemented or supplanted if 
necessary by government-provided insurance. The fact that compen-
sation may make little sense as a goal of negligent-director liability is 
simply a corollary of this broader phenomenon. 
Given the above discussion, it is not surprising that many writers 
have sought to justify director liability for negligence primarily on 
deterrence rather than compensation grounds. 154 Within the last dec-
ade or so, however, a number of writers principally associated with the 
law-and-economics movement have questioned the necessity of direc-
tor liability to achieve deterrence. 155 They argue that a number of 
economic incentives other than fear of liability exist for directors to 
make careful and reasonable decisions. These incentives include stock 
ownership by directors in their corporation, compensation schemes 
which tie financial rewards to corporate performance, the desire of 
officers and directors to develop and preserve their reputations for 
business acumen so as to advance their individual careers, and the fear 
that poor decisions will make the corporation a takeover target and 
result in the current directors losing their positions. 
Other writers have questioned the efficacy of these incentives. 156 
For example, many of these incentives depend upon poor director 
decisions adversely affecting the market price for the corporation's 
stock. Such a drop, in turn, lowers the value of shares owned by the 
directors, decreases the financial rewards under common compensa-
tion schemes such as stock options, which tie rewards to stock per-
formance, and makes the corporation vulnerable to a takeover. This 
linkage is absent in privately held corporations, where there is no 
153. E.g., Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective 
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 785, 794-95 (1967); Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternativ e to 
Aband oning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault insurance fo r Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. 
REv. 501, 501-20 (1976); Sugarman, supra note 143, at 592-96. 
154. E.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Stan-
dard in Corporate Governance, 75 low A L REv. 1, 16-35 (1989); Coffee, supra note 140, at 805; 
Cohn , supra note 69, at 601-02. 
155. E.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Deriva-
tive Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Anay(sis [sic], 71 CORNELL L. Riov. 261 
(1986); Phillips, supra note 83, at 673-82. 
156. E.g. , Dierdre Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corpo rate Directors, Corporate Realities and 
Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 355-57 (1986); cf 
Bradley & Schipani, supra note 154 (using abnormal stock return study to suggest duty of care 
enhances shareholder value). 
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active market for the company's shares. More broadly, the link 
between specific board decisions and stock prices in many instances 
might be sufficiently attenuated so as to undercut the efficacy of these 
incentives. Cynics might also suggest that career advancement within 
the corporate world depends in many instances upon a whole host of 
factors other than making good business decisions. 
The purpose of this Article is not to enter this debate. Rather, 
consistent with the general theme of this section , the larger flaw in the 
argument about other incentives is that it does not distinguish director 
liability from other contexts in which similar assertions could be made. 
For example, professionals often face market incentives for good per-
formance.157 This may be most visible for trial attorneys whose repu-
tations often hinge upon winning.158 
Another example may hit even closer to home for most readers. 
Consider the incentives automobile drivers have to drive carefully. 
While these lack the ring of "the market for corporate control," they 
would seem nevertheless powerful. Most significant could be simply 
the risk to the driver's personal safety of an accident. There are also 
the criminal penalties imposed for the sort of conduct which often 
leads to accidents, such as speeding or driving while intoxicated, 
regardless of whether the conduct produces an accident. 159 Given 
these incentives , it is unclear how much more careful the average 
driver is because of concern with tort liability-or, indeed, whether in 
the course of driving most individuals even give much thought to tort 
liability.160 In fact, if drivers did react to the threat of tort liability , 
there could well be over-deterrence since liability-insurance rates 
often go up based upon the driver having had an accident, whether or 
not it was the driver's fault. 161 Of course, the sorry fact is that despite 
157. E.g., Larry E. Rib stein, The Deregulation of limited Liability and the Death of Partner-
ship, 70 WA SH. U. L.Q. 417, 435 (1992). 
158. The names Bailey, Belli , Darrow, and Spence come quickly to mind. 
159. E.g., CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATRO L, 1990 AN NUAL REPORT OF FATAL ANO INJURY 
MoT OR VEHICLE TRAFFJC A ccJOENTS 46 (reporting that driving under the influence is the larg-
est primary cause of fatal traffic accidents and speeding is the next largest primary cause). 
160. But see Elizabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No·Fault Accid ents, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 49 (1982) (finding an 
increase in auto fatality rates when no-fault plans do away with tort suits) . This result may, 
however, simply reflect an increase in driving when no-fault plans lower the cost of auto insur-
ance, rather than an increase in negligent driving as a proporti on of the whole. Sugarman , supra 
note 143, at 589. 
161. E.g., Blum & Kalven , supra note 106, at 257. 
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these incentives one seems to constantly encounter negligent 
driving.162 
B. TESTING THE JUSTIFICATIONS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS 
Perhaps the ultimate test of these various justifications for a spe-
cial liability standard for directors is to examine whether they would 
be persuasive in distinguishing between directors and other defend-
ants in specific contexts. Consider first the situation in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom. 163 One aspect of the case relevant here is the guidance the 
directors of Trans Union received from an outside counsel brought in 
to advise them on the proposed sale of the company. The attorney 
evidently did not warn the directors they were about to breach their 
duty of care by acting on the limited information before them. On the 
contrary, the attorney purportedly advised the board members that 
they did not need an investment banker's fairness opinion regarding 
the proposed sale and, what is more, he stated they might be sued if 
they voted not to sell.164 
These facts lead one to wonder what would have happened had 
either the directors or the shareholders sued this attorney for malprac-
tice.165 The standard against which the court would have measured 
the attorney's advice presumably would be the familiar skill and care 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by attorneys in the locality.166 No 
court has ever suggested the business judgment rule would provide a 
defense for a corporation's outside counsel.167 In contrast, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that under the business judgment rule the 
162. For an argument that tort liability is generally ineffective at deterring negligent conduct 
see Sugarman, supra note 143, at 564-81. 
163. 488 A.2d &58 (Del. 1985). 
164. Id. at 881. The court characterized the attorney's purported advice as literally true. 
This was being too kind. Whether or not the advice was literally true, the failure to warn the 
directors that they were about to breach their duty by acting on inadequate information clearly 
raises the issue of malpractice. See, e.g., Bukoskey v. Walter W. Shuham CPA, P.C., 666 F. Supp. 
181 (D. Alaska 1987). 
165. Whether the appropriate plaintiffs would be the directors , the shareholders, or both 
raises the question to whom the corporate counsel's duty runs. For present purposes, however, it 
is unnecessary to resolve which party should sue, because the concern here lies with the stagdard 
for liability to anyone. 
166. See, e.g., McOain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090 (Del. 1977); MALLEN & SMITif, supra note 
95, at 856-57. While some ar-chaic legal-malpractice cases refer to a standard of gross negligence, 
this usage has disappeared. Id. at 884-87. 
167. Cf. Holland v. Stenhouse , 1991 WL 30138 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In this case, the trustee for a 
bankrupt insurance company sued both the former directors for breach of their duty of care and 
the company's attorney for legal malpractice for, among other things, failing to advise the direc-
tors of their duty. The directors moved to dismiss based upon Delaware's business judgment 
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directors of Trans Union could not be liable unless they were grossly 
negligent. 168 Why the difference? Can any of the previously discussed 
justifications explain such a result? 169 
To begin with, would after-the-fact judicial review of the attor-
ney's advice pose any lesser problem here than did review of the 
directors' decision? The decision of what and how much legal advice 
to give is a question of judgrnent. 170 In Van Gorkom, the attorney had 
to weigh the risk ( ultimately realized) that he would fail to warn the 
directors of an action which would lead to their liability versus the risk 
that if he urged too much caution upon the directors they could lose 
the opportunity for a highly desirable sale.171 This substantially paral-
lels the judgment the directors of Trans Union had to make. Indeed, it 
is difficult to see-especially given the narrow margin by which the 
directors lost this case, 172 as well as the general uncertainty in this 
whole area of law173-how the attorney's decision was much less intui-
tive and judgmental than the directors' .174 Litigation over whether 
the attorney negligently advised the Trans Union board would risk the 
fact finder confusing bad results (the board was held liable) with negli-
gence and would be expensive even if the attorney won. This pros-
pect, in turn, creates an incentive for attorneys to avoid the risk of 
liability for themselves by always warning the client of any potential 
rule . There is no indication any party considered the business judgment rule at all relevant to 
the claim against the attorney. 
168. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. 
169. One might be more sympathetic to the directors than the attorney because they were 
operating based upon his poor advice . This, however, goes to the question of whether there was 
reasonable reliance upon advice so as to preclude a finding of negligence. E.g., CAL. CoRP. 
Cooe § 309(b) (West 1992). It does not justify applying a standard for liability other than ordi· 
nary negligence. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 584 (Cal. 
1986) (holding that directors ' reasonable reliance on expert advice should be taken into account 
under an ordinary negligence standard). 
170. E.g., Davis v. Damrell , 174 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Ct. App. 1981). 
171. The directors were meeti ng on Saturday; the offer expired Monday morning . 488 A.2d 
at 867. 
172. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision was 3·2. Id. at 858. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60. 
174. Admittedly , one might distinguish the attorney , who was only advising, from the direc-
tors, who were deciding whether to delay and seek more information. It is unrealistic, however , 
to argue the corporation's attorney does not need to exercise judgment in giving advice because 
the ultimate decision rests with the board. For one thing , it is questionable whether the Trans 
Union board would have had the nerve to go ahead with immediate apprnval when confronted 
with an attorney's opinion that it faced liability. Cf. SEC v. National Studen t Marketing Corp., 
457 F. Supp . 682, 713 (D.D .C. 1978) (speculating that board might not have violated securities 
law if attorney had objected) . Moreover, an att orney who avoids exercising judgment by 
attempting to warn clients about every contingency risks finding those warnings ignored when 
the client should heed them. 
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hazard. 175 The result of such a practice, however, is to undermine the 
utility of the attorney's advice to the client, who is left to figure out 
what warnings to take seriously. About the only thing one could say is 
that judges (at least in Delaware) have some expertise in providing 
legal advice to corporate boards. 176 Yet, expertise cannot explain a 
different standard here. Consider the fact that had the board received 
poor advice from a professional other than an attorney-such as an 
opinion on valuation from an investment banker-the standard in a 
malpractice suit presumably still would not have been the business 
judgment rule .177 
If problems of after-the-fact judicial review would not have justi-
fied different treatment of the lawyer in Van Gorkom, neither would 
the nature of the damages or the plaintiff. The damages faced by the 
attorney presumably would have been the same as faced by the direc-
tors he advised. Similarly, if the shareholders of Trans Union sued the 
attorney, there would be no difference in the plaintiff to explain the 
different standard applied. 
Is there any difference in terms of the economic utility of com-
pensation or deterrence? In a suit against either the directors or the 
attorney, compensation would come largely from insurance. While 
the attorney's policy would not have been purchased directly by the 
corporation, as were the directors', the corporation ( along with the 
law firm's other clients) paid for the attorney's policy through the fees 
the attorney charged. In either event, liability for negligence is an 
expensive way to achieve loss spreading. 178 As far as deterrence is 
175. This fear may, in part, explain why the attorney in Van Gorkom apparently gave the 
members of the board the unfortunate advice that they might be sued if they voted not to sell. 
176. Judges in Delaware, however, might also possess a fair degree of expertise in corporate 
decisions generally. On the other hand, given the penchant of some governors to appoint trial 
lawyers, and especially former district attorneys, to the bench, one might question how much 
expertise some judges have in providing legal advice to corporate boards. 
177. Cf Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1987) 
(holding investment banker liable for failure to use due care in valuation option), re11'd on other 
grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988). 
178. Some writers have argued that directors are poorer "loss avoiders" than outside attor-
neys or accountants because directors do not spread the loss over a large base of clients. E.g., 
Coffee, supra note 140, at 802. Why this makes any difference is obscure. Cf Robinson, supra 
note 112, at 180-82 (challenging the notion that doctors are cheaper loss-avoiders because of 
their ability to spread costs among their patients). Either director- and officer- or legal-malprac-
tice insurance spreads the loss-albeit in either case through an administratively expensive sys-
tem. In either case, there is some "social accounting." The consumers, here the corporations, 
will pay for the injuries which may occur to themselves by virtue of the legal or managerial 
services they are buying-e ither through higher fees to cover the legal-malpractice insurance or 
by directly paying for the directors' liability policy. Hence, in both cases liability serves the same 
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concerned, the attorney, like the directors, faces market incentives. 
After all, the mergers and acquisitions field is one in which a reputa-
tion for good results can dictate economic success for a lawyer. 179 
Conversely, one might suspect boards would be leery of hiring an 
attorney who previously led his clients into a well publicized fiasco.180 
As a second test of these justifications, consider the following 
hypothetical, somewhat inspired by recent events. Suppose a corpora-
tion operates oil tankers . Due to a decision by one of the company's 
captains as to speed, course, or whatever, a company ship runs 
aground, resulting in an oil spill. If coastal-property owners damaged 
by the spill sue the corporation, the issue will be whether the captain's 
decision was negligent. 181 The corporation would hardly get any-
where by arguing for a "nautical judgment rule" under which it could 
avoid liability unless the captain acted in bad faith, or with gross 
rather than ordinary negligence, or which confined the fact finder to 
focusing exclusively or primarily upon the methodology by which the 
captain reached the decision rather than upon the decision itself. 
Moreover, since the corporation's liability is vicarious , the captain 
could be personally liable to the damaged coastal property owners for 
negligence. 182 The captain, too , would not get far arguing for a differ-
ent threshold for liability. 
Now suppose the corporation sued its captain to indemnify it for 
the judgment it paid the property owners or even for loss of the ship 
and cargo. Again, the standard upon which the captain's liability will 
hinge is simple negligence. 183 There appears to be little or no author-
possible function of avoiding overconsumption of services which do not reflect their full cost. 
Moreover, even if there is some utility to imposing the cost of injuries on enterprises able to 
disperse those costs in the price of goods or services charged to a wide customer base, liability 
for negligence has never been so limited. E.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
179. Just ask Joseph Flom, the noted takeover attorney at Skadden , Arps , Meagher, Slate & 
Flom. 
180. The problem is not simply that the director s were liable. Business client s may appreci-
ate attorneys willing to propose an aggressive position to achieve their aims even though there is 
some risk of liability. Probably no one, however. appreciates being blindsided by facing liability 
without any warning . 
181. This assumes that the transport of oil is not an ultra-hazardous activity resulting in strict 
liability. 
182. E.g., Dwyer v. Lanon & Snow Lumber Co .. 297 P.2d 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); McDon-
ald v. Frontier Lanes, 272 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App . Ct. 1971); Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, 470 A.2d 86 
(Pa. 1983). 
183. E.g., Fenty v. Revell, 228 P.2d 905 (Kan. 1951); State ex rel. Algiere v. Russell , 223 
S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1940); Darman v. Zilch, 186 A. 21 (R.1. 1936) (holding that an employee is 
liable to his employer for the employee's acts of negligence which cause the employer damage, 
whether the damage is direct or brought about by the compensation the employer must pay to a 
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ity for applying the business judgment rule to accidents caused by cor-
porate employees below top management. 184 
To introduce the business judgment rule, let us change the facts of 
the hypothetical. To keep things simple, assume the grounding was 
the result of a storm or, in any event, not the result of any person's 
negligence. Assume also, however , that had the tanker possessed a 
double hull, it would have survived the grounding without a spill. Fur-
ther, let us suppose the corporation's board of directors made the 
decision to purchase single- rather than double-hulled oil tankers. 
This was a business decision in which the board had to balance the 
protective advantages of double hulled tankers against their added 
costs and lower cargo-carrying capabilities. What would the result be 
if the damaged-coastal-property owners sued the corporation? Again, 
the standard for liability would be simple negligence, not the business 
judgment rule .185 The same would be true if the damaged property 
owners sued the directors personally: Courts do not apply the business 
judgment rule to suits by third parties against directors whose deci-
sions have caused injury.186 
third party injured by the negligent act) . Incidentally , lest one think the notion of the corpora-
tion suing its ship captain is too far fetched, see Gaffner v. Johnson, 81 P. 859 (Wash. 1905). In 
Gaffner, after a steamship collided with another vessel, the steamship's owner sued the captain 
for negligence. The court affirmed a judgment requiring the captain to indemnify the owner for 
the sum that the owner had to pay to the owner of the other ship. 
184. See, e.g., Steffen , supra note 58, at 487 (ordinary employees held to higher standard 
than directors) ; Manning , supra note 86, at 652 (business judgment rule is applicable only at the 
highest corporate level). There is some authority that the business judgment rule may apply to 
executive officers of the corporation. E.g., Kaplan v. Centex Corp. 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch . 
1971). This presumably refers to top corporate officers , such as the president, not to ship 
officers. 
185. This is the sort of corporate-safety-versus-cost decision toward which Judge Hand 
directed his formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co ., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
186. E.g., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 582-83 (Cal. 1986) (stat-
ing that the court was unaware of any case from any jurisdiction in which the business judgment 
rule governed a director's liability in tort to third persons); Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Coli-
seum , Inc., 465 N .E.2d 904 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
A potential source of confusion when discussing third-party claims against corporate direc-
tors comes from the rule that directors generally are not liable to third parties for breaching the 
duty of care owed to the corporation . E.g., Newman v. Forward Lands, 418 F. Supp. 134, 137 
(E.D. Pa. 1976). This is simply part of the rule of agency law that the mere failure to perform an 
agent's duty to his or her principal does not, except in certain cases, render the agent liable to a 
third party injured by the neglect. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF AOENCY § 352 (1984). On 
the other hand, neither directors nor other agents can escape liability for conduct which would 
otherwise constitute a tort toward a third party just because the director or agent was acting on 
behalf of the corporation. E.g., Frances T., 723 P.2d at 582-83; RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OP 
AOENCY §§ 343, 350. Difficulties in reconciling these two propositions occur primarily when the 
claim involves inaction by the director or agent and economic loss rather than physical injury. 
See, e.g .• Newman, 418 F. Supp. at 136-37; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AOENCY §§ 354, 357. 
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Now, however, consider what would happen if the corporation 
sued the directors, either to indemnify it for any payment to the 
injured property owners or for loss of the ship and cargo. This would 
seem to call for application of the business judgment rule .187 The 
incongruities are striking. The same board decision about double 
hulls which a court would have no trouble scrutinizing under an ordi-
nary negligence standard in a suit brought by third parties-either 
against the corporation or against the directors personally-would 
suddenly demand the lesser scrutiny of the business judgment rule 
when the corporation brought the suit. Moreover, any qualms about 
the corporation suing those acting on its behalf would fade immedi-
ately if the suit was against the captain rather than the directors. 188 
Can any of the proffered justifications possibly explain the dis-
tinctions here? Would after-the-fact judicial review of the directors' 
decision regarding double hulls present that much greater probability 
of error or of deterring worthwhile risk taking than would review of 
the ship captain's judgment? 189 Even if so, the difficulties of after-the-
fact review cannot explain the different standards applied to the 
However, the hypothetical in the text involves a decision to purchase single-hulled tankers 
rather than inaction, which results in physical injury to coastal property rather than merely eco-
nomic loss. More fundamentally, this whole issue goes to whether there is any duty to the third 
party at all; it does not act, as does the business judgment rule, to alter the standard of fault 
required. 
187. Perhaps the normal rule requiring one who is at fault to reimburse the party whose 
liability is vicarious would apply to the company's claim for reimbursemen t of funds paid to the 
injured property holders. However, this is by no means certain. 
188. The situation facing the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Uccello v. Gold'N Foods, 
Inc., 90 N.E.2d 530 (Mass. 1950), came tantalizingly close to creating such a paradox. Uccello, a 
minority shareholder in Gold'N Foods, sued the directors for mismanagement. Gold'N Foods 
manufactured salad dressing. Due to use of poor ingredients, Gold'N Foods suffered numerous 
complaints and returns of spoiled dressing, and ultimately went out of business. The directors 
knew of the problem but continued manufacturing without solving it. The court applied a gross 
negligence standard under its interpretation of the business judgment rule and exonerated the 
directors. Fortunately, the spoilage did not create a health hazard. Had the spoilage done so, 
then the Massachusetts court would have confronted the situation in which the same board deci-
sion would face review under a gross or under an ordinary negligence standard-this case having 
arisen before strict products liability--<:lepending upon who brought the action. Moreover, had 
an ordinary employee's negligence caused the spoilage, the business judgment rule presumab ly 
would not apply even to an action by the company against the employee. 
189. [I]t is a mistake to say that it is only the director who has to make decisions calling 
for initiative and good judgment . The truck driver on the road, under orders to make a 
schedule, perhaps furnished with defective equipment, makes more decisions of the 
kind per mile, than many directors do in a month. Whether or not to pass the car 
ahead, and thus to forward the employer's affairs, involves serious business risk, and 
surely calls for skill and good judgment. Why then does the "law" say that if the driver 
makes even one mistake, it is at his risk; while any good faith error on the part of a 
director merely results in a "business" loss? 
Steffen, supra note 58, at 487. 
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double-hull decision depending upon whether the suit is by the 
injured property owners or by ( or on behalf of) the corporation . 
Clearly, the nature of the damages cannot explain the results: The 
damages are substantially the same throughout. 190 
The difference in the nature of the plaintiff might account for the 
different standards applied to the directors' decision; but then what 
about the corporation 's action against the ship captain? Perhaps one 
might argue that the business judgment rule should insulate all corpo-
rate employees from liability for ordinary negligence. Suppose, in 
that event, the grounding resulted from the decision of a harbor pilot 
who was working for the company as an independent contractor ? 
Alternately, suppose a partnership or sole proprietorship operated the 
tanker: Should employees have a different standard of liability 
depending upon whether they work for a corporation or an unincor-
porated employer? In short , once one starts suggesting corporations 
should be unable to sue some of their employees for ordinary negli-
gence, it is difficult to know where to stop. 
Finally, what about compensation or deterrence? Putting aside 
the questions of whether the injured coastal property owners might 
just as well have purchased insurance for themselves, or whether their 
need for compensation exists even if the spill was not the result of 
negligence, it is clear that the corporation's need for compensation 
cannot explain the difference in the standard between the corpora-
tion's suit of the ship captain and of the directors. As for deterrence 
goals, how this distinguishes the appropriate standard for the captain 
versus the directors is a mystery.191 
The bottom line is that utilizing the business judgment rule to 
insulate directors from liability for ordinary negligence creates differ-
ences in treatment between individuals which cannot be explained by 
any policy justifications . That alone should be enough to condemn 
this approach. Yet, there are other difficulties with the rule that the 
following two sections of this Article explore. 
190. The damages involve property loss rather than personal injury and are potentially 
enormous. 
191. The captain possesses market incentives for care-he must worry about his job--not to 
mention incentives based upon his concern for his personal safety. 
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C. THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
As stated earlier, 192 the business judgment rule only protects 
directors from liability when their decision does not involve a conflict 
of interest. 193 This is not to say that directors are automatically liable 
for any transaction which involves a conflict. Rather, the court 
reviews such a transaction to see if it is fair to the corporation. Under 
this fairness test, the defendant must prove that the transaction was 
one which would have commended itself to a disinterested board. 194 
The result of this approach is to divide board decisions into two types: 
those which involve a conflict of interest and those which do not. 
Because of the danger that directors will consciously or unconsciously 
sacrifice corporate interests for their own, courts subject conflict of 
interest transactions to heightened scrutiny, while using a more 
relaxed review when directors are disinterested. 
One problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to 
square with the realities of board decisionmaking. Board decisions 
often do not fit neatly into the polar model of either interested direc-
tor transactions or disinterested decisions. Instead , board decisions all 
too frequently involve "fuzzy" or partial conflicts of interest. Here, 
the directors do not stand on both sides of a transaction with their 
company, yet the decision involves personal concerns for the directors 
which can bias their judgment away from the corporation's best inter-
est. Two examples, which have been at the hub of much corporate 
litigation, illustrate the point. 
The first example consists of the defenses against hostile take-
overs which directors of target companies often employ.195 Generally, 
such defenses do not entail transactions between the target corpora-
tion and its directors, or between the target and other firms in which 
the directors have a stake. 196 Accordingly , these defenses do not 
involve a traditional conflict of interest situation. Because of this, a 
192. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
193. E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984); Lewis v. S.L. 
& E. Inc., 629 F .2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
194. E.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence , 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 
737 (Del. 1960); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, 
§ 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt. at 289-92 (explaining fairness test). 
195. For a description of many of the most common takeover defenses see GevuRTZ, supra 
note 92, at 781-86. 
196. Possible exceptions include golden parachutes as well as lockups given to acquiring 
firms in a management buy.out. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillian, Inc., 559 A.2d 
1261 (Del. 1989). 
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number of courts have applied the business judgment rule to such 
defenses .197 Other courts 198 and writers199 dissent from this approach. 
They note the inherent conflict of interest board members face when 
opposing a hostile takeover which might cost the directors their 
jobs.200 
A second example comes from the phenomenon of boards of 
directors, or specially appointed committees of boards, moving to dis-
miss shareholder derivative litigation .201 Many courts have applied 
the business judgment rule to such motions.202 Yet, a serious question 
exists as to whether even directors who are not defendants in the 
derivative action can review free of any conflict the corporation's 
interest in a suit against fellow directors . A number of courts and 
writers have outlined the various sources which can produce a "struc-
tural bias" in such a situation. 203 
197. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (but 
holding that directors' conduct failed on due care grounds); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 
F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Intemorth , Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. 
Johnson v. Trueblood , 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that business judgment rule will not 
apply if directors ' predominant motive was to preserve their control) . 
198. E.g., Dynamics Corp . of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd 
on other grounds , 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 
1984); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Ct. App. 1985). 
199. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensiv e Tactics, and 
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733, 1745.47 (1981); Marc I. Steinberg, Tender Offer Regu-
lation: The Need for Reform , 23 WAKE FoREST L. Rev. 1, 5-8 (1988). 
200. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cen . denied, 454 U.S. 
1092 (1981). In Panter, Judge Cudahy observed: 
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are, at the very least, "inter-
ested" in their own positions of power, prestige and prominence (and in their not 
inconsequential perquisites). They are "interested" in defend ing against outside attack 
the management which they have, in fact, installed or maintained in power- "their" 
management (to which, in many cases, they owe their directorships). And they are 
"interested" in maintain ing the public reputation of their own leadership and steward-
ship against the claims of "ra iders" who say that they can do better. 
Id. at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., concurrin g in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). The flip 
concern may exist when directors will retain positions in a merged corporation, thereby giving 
the directors personal incentives to approve a merger. See, e.g., Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 
372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963) (rejecting the argument that this incentive created a conflict of 
interest). 
201. For a discussion of this phenomenon see George W. Dent, The Power of Directors to 
Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 96 
(1980). 
202. E.g., Gaines v. Haughton , 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 
(1982); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Swanson v. 'Iraer , 249 F.2d 
854 (7th Cir. 1957); Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Auerbach v. Bennett, 
393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
203. E.g., Joy v. North , 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) ("We must be mindful that directors 
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While these two examples have provoked the most litigation and 
commentary in the last couple of decades, they by no means exhaust 
the fuzzy conflict of interest problem. Rather, they are simply vari-
ants on several broader conflict of interest situations . If the directors' 
concerns about their jobs make one suspicious of their disinterest in 
considering takeover defenses, what about transactions which involve 
controlling or even major shareholders? This includes both parent-
subsidiary dealings, as well as transactions with individuals having 
large stockholdings. For example, the Aronson v. Lewis decision men-
tioned previously204 involved a consulting contract Meyers Parking 
System, Inc. made with an individual owning forty-seven percent of its 
shares.205 A director concerned about remaining with the corpora-
tion's board is going to have a difficult time voting against a transac-
tion desired by a controlling shareholder. 
Alternately, once one accepts the notion that structural bias may 
undermine the disinterest of board members weighing litigation 
against fellow directors, then one starts to question how objective 
directors can be in any decision in which other board members have a 
stake. 206 The presumption behind most corporation statutes dealing 
with conflict of interest situations is that the directors not transacting 
business with the corporation can look out for the corporation's best 
interests . This is implicit in the statutes' establishing approval by dis-
interested directors as an alternative to proving fairness in order to 
validate a transaction in which some directors have an interest .207 Yet, 
this presumption may be at odds with the practical and psychological 
realities of board decisionmaking .208 
are passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this 
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members. The question 
naturally arises whether a 'there but for the grace of God go I' empathy might not play a role.") ; 
Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 283; Dent , :,upro note 201, at 111-17. 
204. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); :,ee supra text accompanying note 51. 
205. Arons on, 473 A.2d at 808; see also Puma v. Marriott , 283 A .2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971) 
(involving a transaction with a family owning 44 percent of the corporation stock) . 
206. But see Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 283 (arguing that structural bias is a 
worse problem when reviewing a derivative suit against a fellow director). 
207. State corpo rat ions codes commonly contain a section that validates transactions despite 
one or more of the company's directors having a conflict of interest , provided the transaction 
receives approval by disintere sted directors or by shareholders , or is shown to be fair to the 
company. E.g., DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 
1992); see also M.B.C.A. §§ 8.60-8.63. But see CAL CoRP. CooE § 310(a)(2) (West 1992) 
(requiring fairness with disinterested directors' approval). 
208. E.g., MYLES M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYlrl & REALI TY (1971); PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GovERNANCE, supra note 2, § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt. at 293; Victor Brudney, The Independ ent 
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Faced with these examples, one could argue about where courts 
should draw the line between business judgment and fairness 
review.209 Recognizing conflicts of interest beyond the traditional 
transaction in which the director stands at both ends, however, poten-
tially opens the door to fairness review of a myriad of board decisions. 
For example, is there a conflict of interest when a bank loans money 
to a developer who employs the son of the bank's president? 210 What 
if the son worked only in a summer job? What if the employee was a 
nephew? What if the developer was simply a friend of the chair-
man ?211 In short, conflicts of interest are not the rare and easily 
defined exception, but instead constitute a hazy background pervad-
ing much of corporate decisionmaking.212 
This problem, in turn, impacts the choice of the duty of care stan-
dard under the business judgment rule. If courts apply a standard of 
ordinary negligence to nominally disinterested transactions, there will 
be some gap between the fairness and duty of care standards, at least 
because the burden of proof will be on different sides. Nevertheless, 
there will be a review of the objective reasonableness of a transaction 
even if the court finds no conflict of interest.213 Hence, there will be 
some check on the directors making poor decisions due to the influ-
ence of these partial conflicts of interest, without creating the burden 
which would result if every conceivable conflict of interest resulted in 
a full-blown fairness review. If courts, however, utilize the business 
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 607-31 (1982); Note, The 
Propriety of Judicial Deference 10 Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983). 
209. E.g., Arsht, supra note 25, at 116-17; Manning, supra note 86, at 618. 
210. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). 
211. See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224 A.2d 634, 640 (Pa. 1966); see also PRINCIPLES 
OP CORPORATE GovERNANCE, supra note 2, § 4.0l(c) Illustration 5, at 243 (considering 
favorable business deals with a fellow alumnus). The variations are endless. See, e.g., RJR 
Nabisco Shareholders Litigation, (1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 94,194, 
at 91,711 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 1989): 
Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so 
might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or, as is here alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any 
human emotion may cause a director to place his own interests, preferences or appe-
tites before the welfare of the corporation. 
The latest version of the M.B.C.A. attempts to square the circle in this area. While recognizing 
the potential for "countless relationships and linkages," the Model Act offers an exclusive defini-
tion of conflicting interests. M.B.C.A. § 8.60 cmt. 
212. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 
(1981) (arguing that the business judgment rule is based on the recognition that all director 
decisions involve some personal interest but it would be impractical to take this into account). 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
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judgment rule to insulate directors from liability for ordinary negli-
gence, then the gap between the fairness test and the standard appli-
cable to nominally disinterested transactions widens considerably. 
Accordingly, interpreting the business judgment rule to require a 
showing of gross negligence for liability, to lessen the court's ability to 
review the substance of a decision as opposed to the process used to 
reach it, or to preclude any review other than as to subjective good 
faith, increases the stakes placed upon the initial determination of 
whether the directors are disinterested. Given the prevalence off uzzy 
conflict of interest situations, increasing the stakes in this manner 
would move things in the wrong direction. 
Litwin v. Allen 214 provides a good illustration of this point. As 
noted earlier,215 Litwin is one of the most often cited cases applying 
an ordinary negligence standard to find directors liable for a business 
decision. Some writers have sought to explain the result in Litwin by 
pointing out that the case involved something of a conflict of inter-
est.216 Specifically, Morgan Stanley owned a substantial block of stock 
in both Guaranty Trust and indirectly in the firm which sold Guaranty 
Trust the debentures. By using a standard which allowed it to review 
the objective reasonableness of the debenture purchase , the court was 
able to avoid having the case tum on the question of whether to apply 
a fairness review. 
D. THE JUDICIALLY CREATED BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN AN 
AREA OF STATUTORY LAW 
Another difficulty raised by using the business judgment rule to 
alter the appropriate standard for duty of care liability is how this will 
coordinate with various state corporations statutes. There are two 
types of problems to consider here. The first concerned the drafters of 
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. Section 8.30 sets out a 
statutory standard for the directors' duty of care. This requires a 
director to act "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances" and "in a man-
ner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. "217 Numerous state corporations statutes contain similar 
214. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. a. 1940). 
215. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
216. E.g., Ci.ARK, supra note 15, at 127. 
217. M.B.C.A. § 8.30(a). 
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language.218 The problem is that such language, to the common law-
yer's understanding, is synonymous with the standard for ordinary 
negligence.219 This creates an apparent conflict when courts apply the 
business judgment rule to preclude director liability for ordinary 
negligence.220 
Those who would use the business judgment rule to insulate 
directors from liability for ordinary negligence have dealt with this 
seeming contradiction in a couple of ways ( other than just by ignoring 
it) . One way is to interpret the statutes as imposing a lower duty on 
directors. 221 For example, some judicial decisions have viewed stat-
utes which speak of the care of an ordinary prudent person "in similar 
circumstances" not to create the same duty of ordinary care which the 
statute would if it spoke of an ordinary prudent person "in his own 
affairs."222 The notion appears to be the rather strange one that the 
ordinary prudent person should be less careful with other people's 
money than with his or her own. More fundamentally, to view the "in 
similar circumstances" language as somehow abrogating an ordinary 
negligence standard ignores the fact that such language is an integral 
part of the reasonable person test, not a contradiction of it.223 Pre-
sumably for these reasons, few, if any, recent decisions rely on this 
distinction. 224 
218. E.g .• 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. § 8.30, at 934-37 {3d ed. 1990) {listing over 34 
state statutes containing provisions similar to section 8.30 of the Model Act). 
219. E.g., Arsht and Hinsey, supra note 11, at 951; Dyson, supra note 37, at 371,375; Veasey 
& Manning, supra note 11, at 927. 
220. E.g., Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat 'I Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 257 {M.D. Pa. 1987). 
221. E.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal lns. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 
1989) (interpreting the statute at issue to require gross negligence). 
222. E.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224 A.2d 634, 640-41 (Pa. 1966) (equating "in 
similar circumstances" language with a gross negligence standard). 
223. E.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, at 175. 
224. Keyser, 615 F. Supp. at 255-58 (interpreting Pennsylvania statute using "under similar 
circumstances" language to create liability for ordinary negligence); Veasey & Manning, supra 
note 11, at 926-27 n.36 (stating that Selheimer represent s the rare, if not the only, case where this 
distinction has been determinative of the outcome). A more recent effort to interpret statutory 
duty of care provisions to impose a lower standard for directors than the common law of torts is 
found in Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 
P.2d 573 (Cal. 1986). The majority in Frances T. held the directors of a condominium association 
liable for ordinary negligence to a third party injured by their refusal to install adequate lighting. 
In dissent, Justice Mosk argued that the standard in the corporations code supplanted the com-
mon law of negligence even as to claims by third parties . Id. at 595 (Mosk, J ., dissenting). He 
further argued that the statute adopted a "somewhat lower" standard than the common law of 
negligence, the statutory standard being one of "subjective reasonableness." Id. at 596. He 
based this conclusion on three portions of the statute. Id. at 597. To begin with, the statute 
requires directors to act in good faith. This, however, hardly suggests a lower standard of care 
since the good faith language is part of a conjunctive test with the prudent person language. 
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This has led to the alternate approach alluded to in the Official 
Comment to section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act. 
The notion is that the corporations statute sets out the directors' duty 
of care, but does not address what impact breach of this duty will cre-
ate. For example, section 8.30( d) states that directors who meet the 
standard of care cannot be liable,225 but section 8.30 does not state 
what happens if directors do not fulfill their duty. This omission in 
turn, the argument runs, allows the courts to decide the rules for 
imposing liability. Hence, the courts can apply a business judgment 
rule that insulates directors from liability despite the directors' having 
fallen below the statutory mandate of reasonable care. As the Official 
Comment to section 8.30 explains: 
If compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in former sec-
tion 35 or section 8.30 is established, there is no need to consider 
possible application of the business judgment rule. The possible 
application of the business judgment rule need only be considered if 
compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in former section 
35 or section 8.30 is not established.226 
It is, of course, possible for legislatures to enact statutes setting out 
the duties of corporate directors with the expectation that courts will 
refuse to impose liability on directors who fail to carry out those 
duties. This would seem to be a rather queer and pointless exercise, 
however. Accordingly, this approach is not persuasive. 
Recently enacted provisions in many states seeking to protect 
directors from duty of care liability present a different concern. A 
Second, the California statute deleted the express requirement found in the Model Act that 
directors must be reasonable in their belief that their action is in the best interest of the corpora-
tion. CAL. CoRP. CooE § 309(a) (West 1992). Whether the California legislature did this in 
order to lower the standard or because it felt the "reasonably believes" language unnecessary in 
view of the ordinary-care language which follows is something one will never know. See Henry 
L. Stern, The General Standard of Care Imposed on Directors Under the New California General 
Corporation Law, 23 UCLA L. REv. 1269, 1278 (1976) (speculating that the drafters felt that 
California courts would imply a requirement of reasonableness in directors belief that an action 
is in a company's best interest). Finally, Justice Mosk: argued that the "ordinarily prudent per -
son" standard in the code was intended to exclude the idea that directors must be experts or 
even must apply any special expertise they possess, rather than to encompass the traditional 
common law meaning of this phrase. Frances T., 723 P.2d at 597-98. If, in fact, the legislature 
meant to use a common law tenn of art in such a peculiar way, one hopes the legislature would 
be clearer about stating this intent than by using the sort of negative implications upon which 
Justice Mosk relies. At any event, insofar as Justice Mosk's arguments hinge upon differences 
between the California statute and legislative history, and the Model Act and its accompanying 
explanations, these arguments reinforce the notion that the Model Act as adopted in most states 
codifies a standard of ordinary negligence. 
225. M.B.C.A. § 8.30(d). 
226. M.B.C.A. § 8.30 Official Cmt. 
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growing number of states have enacted protective legislation in reac-
tion to a perceived crisis triggered by the Smith v. Van Gorkom 227 
decision. These statutes fall into two broad camps relevant here.228 
The more common type allows individual corporations to change the 
rules of liability by placing provisions in the company's articles which 
limit the exposure of that firm's directors.229 The other type changes 
the grounds for director liability for all firms incorporated in the state. 
For example, the Virginia legislature has reduced the duty of care for 
directors of Virginia corporations to merely require the exercise of the 
director's good faith judgment. 230 
A detailed critique of such legislation is beyond the scope of this 
Article. The general themes developed here, however, suggest a 
couple of broad comments. Provisions in the certificate of incorpora-
tion limiting director liability for negligence present the same funda-
mental issue as contractual waivers of negligence liability in other 
contexts. 231 That issue is the need to reconcile the goal of allowing 
individuals to adjust their relationships to suit themselves by contract 
with the concern that individuals not lose protection against negligent 
injury as a result of economic coercion or the failure to fully appreci-
ate the impact of what they are doing.232 While the basic issue is the 
same when dealing with different groups of prospective defendants, 
the resolution need not be. On the contrary, the prospect for waiver 
by coercion or confusion may depend upon the specific context.233 
When dealing with director liability, this calls for evaluation of the 
227. 488 A.2d &58 (Del. 1985). 
228. A number of states have amended their corporations statutes to specify that directors 
may, consistent with their duty of care, consider the interests of employees, creditors, the com-
munity and others in making decisions for the corporation. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 302A.251(5) (West 1992); N.J . REv. STAT. § 14A:6-14(4) (1992); OHlo REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.59(E) (Baldwin 1993); 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. 15 § 1715 (1992). This, however, does not alter 
the level of care expected of directors; it simply expands the scope of permissible (or even 
mandatory) factors the directors can consider in exercising their care. 
229. E.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 204(a)(10) (West 1992); 8 DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) 
(1992); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 402(b) (McKinney 1992). 
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.l-690(A) (Michie 1992); see also IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-5-l(e) 
(West 1992) (stating that directors are liable only for willful misconduct or recklessness). 
231. E.g., fidelity Storage Co. v. Kingsbury, 79 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1935) (bailment); Tonk! 
v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (medical care); Wagenblast v. 
Odessa School Dist., 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (participation in interscholastic sports). 
232. E.g., Tunk/, 393 P.2d at 445-46 (outlining six factors largely going to the bargaining 
power of the parties for determining if an exculpatory contract violates public policy); Allright, 
Inc. v. Schroeder, 551 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (not enforcing an exculpatory clause 
written in fine print on a claim ticket). 
233. In fact, courts have traditionally enforced exculpatory clauses for some categories of 
defendants but not for other categories. E.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, at 482-83; see also 
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processes of shareholder voting and purchasing decisions-a subject 
about which much has been written. 234 Whatever the appropriate bal-
ance here, there is no logical reason it need be the same as when deal-
ing with, say, waivers by those seeking emergency medical care (when 
the prospects for coercion are of a different order of magnitude). 
Accordingly, if a legislature decides to allow liability waivers in arti-
cles of incorporation, this is not necessarily creating an unjustified dif-
ferentiation in the treatment of corporate directors. Indeed, to the 
extent courts generally uphold liability waivers in employment con-
tracts,235 such legislation actually serves to correlate the treatment of 
directors with that of other agents. 
Unfortunately, similar kind remarks cannot be made about those 
statutory provisions which automatically limit director liability for all 
corporations in a jurisdiction. Such provisions are symptomatic of the 
ad hoc approach to tort law reform under which various groups of 
prospective defendants-doctors, directors or whoever-lobby the 
legislature for special treatment. If, as suggested above, the possible 
problems created by director liability for ordinary negligence parallel 
the problems of negligence liability for many other groups, any legisla -
tive action should deal with the issues across the board. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The obstetrician dealing with a difficult labor, the trial lawyer 
planning strategy, or just the automobile driver attempting a left tum 
into a busy thoroughfare must exercise judgment. So must we all. 
When this judgment results in harm to another, then the doctor, attor-
ney, or driver can find him or herself as the defendant in a suit based 
upon negligence. Perhaps this has produced a system in which there is 
too much second guessing by those who have the benefit of twenty-
twenty hindsight. Perhaps an unintended effect of this Article will be 
to add to the debate over tort law reform. Be that as it may, there is 
simply no call for treating business judgments by corporate directors 
any differently than any other judgment. Where then does this leave 
the business judgment rule? Evidently, it is a phrase of limited utility 
N.Y. GEN. OeLI G. LAw §§ 5-321 to 5-326 (McKinney 1992) (listing activities in which exculpa· 
tory clauses are contrary to public policy). 
234. For a sampling of this literature see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989). 
235. E.g., Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 182 P.2d 18 (Wash. 1947); REsTATEMENT (Sec. 
OND) OF AGENCY§ 379 cmts. a-d (1984). 
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and much potential for mischief. Accordingly, the business judgment 
"rule" is a rule which corporate law would well do without. 
